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JURISDICTION 
Section 3 of Article VIII of the Utah Const, , §78-2-2(3) of 
the Utah Code Ann. , and Rule 3(a), Utah R. App. P. , confer 
jurisdiction on this Court to hear this appeal. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This appeal is from an Amended Order Re: Defendants1 Second 
Motion to Supplement Judgment and Motion to Increase Liability on 
Bond ("Amended Order"), dated May 14, 1990, of the Third Judicial 
District court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding supplementing the 
Judgment entered in this matter on September 26, 1988 with 
interest accruing from that date through February 12, 1990 and 
additional attorney's fees incurred by the Sharps from Septem-
ber 1, 1988 through October 31, 1989. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A ttial court's findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, will not be set aside on appeal unless 
clearly erroneous. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Copper State Leasing 
Co. v. Blacker Appl. & Furn. Co., 770 P.2d 88, 93 (Utah 1988). 
A finding is clearly erroneous only if it is without adequate 
evidentiary support. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193. When 
the terms of the contract are determined to provide for an award 
of attorney's fees, they are to be awarded as a matter of legal 
right, and the amount of such an award is within the trial 
court's discretion. Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 836 (Utah 
1 
Ct. App. 1989). A reviewing court will refrain from adjudicating 
issues on appeal if, pending the appeal, an event occurs which 
makes determination of the issue presented unnecessary and 
renders the case moot. In Interest of A. J. . 736 P.2d 721 (Wyo. 
1987); Despain v. Stewart, 639 P.2d 166 (Utah 1981); Duran v. 
Morris, 635 P.2d 43 (Utah 1981). In this case, the finding of 
the trial court regarding the award of additional attorney's fees 
is a factual finding which cannot be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous and is an award which is clearly within the discretion 
of the trial court. The other issues raised by the appellants in 
their Brief have been rendered moot by subsequent events. 
PRIOR APPEAL 
This is the second appeal filed by the appellants in the 
action before the trial court. The outcome of appellants' first 
appeal was an opinion of this Court, issued on May 25, 1990, in 
which this Court affirmed, in its entirety, the ruling of the 
trial court as it relates to these appellants. The Opinion, 
further, specifically affirmed the trial court's award of 
attorney's fees incurred by the Sharps evidenced by the unrebut-
ted affidavits of the Sharps1 counsel, Saunders v. Sharp, 135 
Utah Adv. Rep. 68, 79 (Utah Ct. App. May 25, 1990), an issue 
raised once again by the appellants in this second appeal. A 
copy of the Opinion is attached hereto as Addendum 1. 
CITATIONS TO THE RECORD 
Citations to the Record will be abbreviated as follows: 
2 
Record on Appeal "R." 
Exhibit "Ex." 
The Addendum includes relevant portions of the record and other 
pleadings and shall be cited to as "Add." with the page number 
following the citation. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The genesis of this second appeal arises from the sale of 
certain property located in White Pine Canyon near Park City, 
Utah (the "property") by John C. and Geraldine Y. Sharp (the 
Sharps) to the appellants or their predecessors in interest 
("White Pine"). To complete the purchase of the property, the 
buyers executed certain documents including a Trust Deed (Ex. 2, 
Add. 6-9) and Trust Deed Note (Ex. 3/ Add. 10) and Memorandum of 
Closing Terms (the "Memo) (Ex. 15, Add. 11-15) (collectively, the 
"Agreement") and agreed to act in accordance with the terms and 
conditions contained therein. The Trust Deed Note provides for 
default interest to be charged on the payments thereunder at the 
rate of 18% per annum, and provides that if it "is collected by 
an attorney after default . . . the undersigned [White Pine] . . 
. agree to pay . . . a reasonable attorney's fee." (Ex. 3, Add. 
10). Paragraph 7 of the Trust Deed provides that sums expended 
thereunder by the beneficiary or trustee shall bear interest at 
the rate of 10% per annum from the date of expenditure until 
paid, and contains three separate provisions for the recovery of 
attorney's fees. (Ex. 2, Add. 7-8) Paragraph 6 provides that 
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the beneficiary [the Sharps] "may commence, appear in and defend 
any action . . . and . . • employ counsel, and pay his reasonable 
fees." Paragraph 7 then requires trustor [White Pine] to "pay 
immediately . . . all sums expended hereunder by beneficiary,lf 
including sums expended in paragraph 6. Finally, under para-
graph 16, the Sharps are entitled to "foreclose the Trust Deed 
[and] . • . recover in such proceeding all costs and expenses 
incident therein, including a reasonable attorneyfs fee." The 
Memo provides in paragraph 11 that the "defaulting party shall 
pay all expenses of enforcing the same or any right arising out 
of breach or default, including reasonable attorney's fees, 
whether incurred with or without suit and both before and after 
judgment." (Emphasis added). (Ex. 15, Add. 14) True and 
correct copies of the Trust Deed Note, Trust Deed, and Memo are 
attached hereto collectively as Addendum 2. 
A dispute arose between the parties as to the respective 
obligations under the contract and on September 26, 1988, after 
concluding that White Pine had materially breached the contract, 
the trial court entered Judgment against White Pine in the total 
amount of $759,415.63, including $144,088.75 in attorney's fees. 
The Judgment categorized the interest on the sums awarded into 
the following categories: (1) interest on principal; (b) inter-
est on costs and expenditures; and (c) interest on property 
taxes. (R. 1372, Add. 18) The Judgment further foreclosed the 
interest of White Pine in the property and ordered that the 
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property be sold and the proceeds be applied toward amounts due 
under the Judgment. (R. 1370-77, Add. 19-20) A true and correct 
copy of the Judgment is attached hereto as Addendum 3. 
White Pine timely perfected the filing of an appeal of the 
Judgment (R. 1440-1442) and on May 25, 1990, this Court affirmed, 
in its entirety, the ruling of the trial court as it related to 
White Pine. Saunders v. Sharp, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 68 (Utah Ct. 
App. May 25, 1990). (Add. 1-5) White Pine's Petition for a Writ 
of Certiorari is now pending before the Supreme Court. 
On May 14, 1990, the trial court entered the Amended Order 
Re: Defendants' Second Motion to Supplement Judgment and Motion 
to Increase Liability on Bond ("Amended Order") (R. 2197-2205, 
Add. 24-32) which supplemented the Judgment with interest through 
February 12, 1990, the date on which the Motion was heard. A 
true and correct copy of the Amended Order is attached hereto as 
Addendum 4. The Amended Order also granted additional attorney's 
fees incurred by the Sharps from September 1, 1988 through 
October 31, 1989 in the amount of $79,967.34, which amount 
excluded certain categories set forth in a Summary of Plaintiffs1 
Objections to Attorney's Fees presented as defendants' Exhibit 2 
at the hearing on defendants' Motion. The excluded categories 
were: "Settlement," "Attorney's Fees," and "Tracy Collins 
Appeal." (Add. 27) The Amended Order specifically categorized 
the various calculations of interest based upon three unrebutted 
Affidavits of Albert D. Nystrom. (R. 1539-49, 1781-90, 2064-66, 
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Add. 33-57) True and correct copies of the Affidavits of Albert 
D. Nystrom, C.P.A., are attached hereto as Addendum 5. The 
Amended Order also required White Pine to pay the delinquent 
property taxes on the property securing the supersedeas bond 
("Lot 1") and to post additional security in the amount of 
$136,899.00 on or before March 15, 1990. (R. 2202, Add. 29) In 
the event White Pine failed to post the additional security by 
March 15, 1990, the Order staying proceedings would be vacated 
and the Sharps would be allowed to proceed with their remedies, 
including foreclosure, as provided in the September 26, 1988 
Judgment. 
On July 12, 1990, White Pine filed identical Motions for 
Stay of Remittitur and Judgment Pending Review and for Approval 
of Supersedeas Bond simultaneously in the trial court (R. 2254-
2257) and in this Court. In an Order dated July 18, 1990, this 
Court refused to consider the Motion based on lack of jurisdic-
tion. (Add. 58) The district court also denied the Motion of 
White Pine by way of a Minute Entry dated August 1, 1990. (Add. 
59) True and correct copies of the Orders are attached hereto 
collectively as Addendum 6. On August 2, 1990, White Pine filed 
a Motion for Stay Pending Action on Petition for Certiorari and 
supporting Memorandum in the Utah Supreme Court. A true and 
correct copy of the Motion is attached hereto as Addendum 7.1 
1White Pinefs Petition for Certiorari is still pending 
before the Utah Supreme Court. 
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The Motion for Stay was granted but the Supreme Court remanded 
the case to the district court for the purpose of fixing the 
amount of the bond. (Add. 73) A true and correct copy of the 
Order of the Utah Supreme Court is attached hereto as Addendum 8. 
On August 23, 1990, the parties hereto entered into a 
Stipulation pursuant to which White Pine posted additional 
security for a supersedeas bond in the amount of $136,899.00 as 
required under the Amended Order and the Sharps stipulated to the 
adequacy of the security posted, in the form of two certificates 
of deposit. A true and correct copy of the Stipulation (without 
attachments) is attached hereto as Addendum 9. Further, the 
parties stipulated that as a result of the posting of additional 
security, the stay of execution of the Judgment would continue in 
effect through October 1, 1990 and after that, until the district 
court, after a motion, has determined the amount of any addition-
al bond and the time set for filing the additional bond has 
expired. (Add. 79-81) 
On November 9, 1990, in an effort to simplify the issues 
raised on appeal, the Sharps filed in district court a Motion to 
Amend the Amended Order to delete from the Amended Order, the 
phrase "for a total Judgment of $938,053.02 as of February 12, 
1990," the phrase to which White Pine objects in this Appeal. A 
true and correct copy of the Motion to Amend the Amended Order is 
attached hereto as Addendum 10. This Motion is currently before 
the trial court. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Sharps agree they are not entitled to compound 
interest but deny the Amended Order has that effect. The Amended 
Order specifically categorizes each calculation of interest to 
avoid any compounding of interest. The Sharps are not seeking to 
compound interest and have, in an effort to simplify the issues 
on appeal, filed a Motion in the trial court to amend the Amended 
Order and delete the phrase "for a total judgment of $938,053.02 
as of February 12, 1990." 
2. The Stipulation pursuant to which the parties agreed to 
the sufficiency of two certificates of deposit totaling 
$136,899.00 as good and sufficient security for their supersedeas 
bond and the actual posting of that bond by White Pine has 
rendered the issue of whether the trial court entered an order 
exceeding the nature and issues raised by the pleadings moot. 
Accordingly, the argument relating to that issue need not be 
considered by this Court. 
3. The district court had subject matter jurisdiction to 
enter the Amended Order since the issues of an increase in the 
supersedeas bond and award of attorney's fees were collateral to 
the issues raised by White Pine in its first appeal and involved 
matters necessary for the protection of the rights of the Sharps 
pending the outcome of the appeal. In fact, both this Court and 
the Utah Supreme Court recognized the trial court as the 
appropriate forum for the bond issues to be determined. 
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4. The supplementation of the Judgment by the amount of 
the attorney's fees incurred by the Sharps is in accordance with 
the terms of the Trust Deed Note, the Trust Deed and the Memo 
constituting the Agreement between the parties and comes within 
the purview of the language of the Judgment and enforcing the 
Agreement between the parties. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
COMPOUND INTEREST IS NOT AWARDED 
IN THE AMENDED ORDER SUPPLEMENTING 
THE JUDGMENT. 
The rate of interest to be awarded on judgments is governed 
by §15-1-4, Utah Code Ann., which provides: 
Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract 
shall conform thereto and shall bear the 
interest agreed upon bv the parties, which 
shall be specified in the judgment; other 
judgments shall be interest at the rate of 
12% per annum. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In this case, the Agreement between the parties provided for 
different rates of interest. The payments to be made under the 
Trust Deed Note, once in default, are to bear the interest rate 
of 18% per annum. (Ex. 3, Add. 10) Expenditures made by the 
beneficiary under the Deed of Trust, however, bear interest at 
the rate of 10% per annum. (Ex. 2, Add. 7) Pursuant to the 
terms of the Utah statute, attorneyfs fees awarded accrued 
interest at the rate of 10% per annum pre-judgment and 12% per 
annum after judgment. Accordingly, the Sharps presented detailed 
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Affidavits of Albert D. Nystrom, a certified public accountant, 
presenting the calculations of all of the various interest rates 
and the per diem rates thereon. (R. 1539-49, 1782-90, 2064-66, 
Add. 33-57) Those affidavits were unrebutted by White Pine. 
In accordance with the calculations of Albert D. Nystrom, 
paragraph 2 of the Amended Order provides for the supplementation 
of the Judgment in the amount of $231,636.97 and itemizes the 
supplementation into specific categories. (R. 2197-2205, Add. 
26-27) Subparagraph 2(b) sets forth pre-judgment interest at 10% 
from March 22, 1988, the date on which the trial court made its 
bench ruling in the trial of this matter to September 26, 1988, 
the date on which the Judgment was finally entered. Subparagraph 
2(c) of the Amended Order then sets forth post-judgment interest 
at specific per diem rates calculated by Albert D. Nystrom from 
September 26, the date of the entry of the Judgment through 
February 12, 1990, the date of the hearing on the Motion to 
Supplement the Judgment. (R. 1539-49, 1782-90, 2064-66; Add. 26-
27) 
The Sharps agree that they are not entitled to compound 
interest. The specific itemization of the interest was calculat-
ed for the very purpose of avoiding any compounding of interest. 
Additionally, although the Sharps deny that the Amended Order has 
the effect of compounding interest, they have submitted a Motion 
in the district court to amend the Amended Order to delete the 
phrase "for a total Judgment of $938,053.02" which phrase, White 
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Pine claims, at pages 9 and 13 of its Brief, is objectionable and 
results in compounding of interest. (Add. 85-87) White Pine's 
appeal as to the issue of interest is, therefore, without merit. 
POINT II 
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT 
ENTERED AN ORDER EXCEEDING THE NATURE 
AND ISSUES RAISED BY THE PLEADINGS 
HAS BEEN RENDERED MOOT. 
Generally, an appellate court should dismiss an appeal if, 
pending the appeal, an event occurs which makes determination of 
the issue presented unnecessary and renders the case moot. In 
Interest of A. J.. 736 p.2d 721 (Wyo. 1987). In that event, the 
case is moot and the court will normally refrain from adjudicat-
ing it on the merits. Despain v. Stewart. 639 P.2d 166 (Utah 
1981); Duran v. Morrisf 635 P.2d 43 (Utah 1981). 
Here, White Pine's objections to the provisions of the 
Amended Order vacating the stay and requiring the posting of 
additional security, at pages 15-20 of its Brief, have been 
rendered moot by White pine's own actions subsequent to the entry 
of that Order. White Pine has entered into a Stipulation by 
which White Pine agreed to post, and has now, in fact, posted the 
additional $136,899.00 required by the Court and by which the 
Sharps agreed to the sufficiency of the form of the security for 
the additional $136,899.00. (Add. 74-80) The terms of the 
Stipulation further render moot the objection to the vacation of 
the stay since the parties agree therein that the stay shall 
continue in effect as does the prior Order of the Utah Supreme 
IX 
Court. (Add. 74-80, 73) Accordingly, it is unnecessary for this 
Court to consider the issue any further.2 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION 
TO ENTER THE AMENDED ORDER. 
On remand, a district court has jurisdiction to interpret 
the decision and mandate of an appellate court. Berland's. Inc. 
v. Northside Shopping Center, 447 P.2d 768 (Okla. 1968). In this 
case, both this Court and the Supreme Court determined jurisdic-
tion to determine the bonding issue was in the district court. 
In order to determine the amount of the bond, and to protect the 
Sharps against damages accruing during the pendency of the 
appeal, the district court, necessarily, had to determine the 
amounts by which the Judgment against White Pine had increased, 
taking into account interest and attorney's fees since the time 
the prior bond amount had been established. The fact that an 
appeal has been filed in a matter and a supersedeas bond posted 
does not stay the accrual of the obligations which are the 
subject of the appeal. Lund v. Lund. 6 Utah 2d 425, 315 P.2d 856 
(1957). The entry of the Amended Order supplementing the 
Judgment is a logical corollary of the determination of the bond 
amount. 
2Even if the issue is not moot, the Amended Order reflects 
what happens by operation of law. Under Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 
62 (d) , a stay is effective only when the supersedeas bond is 
approved by the court. A court cannot approve a bond until it is 
posted. 
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Even in absence of remand, a trial court has jurisdiction to 
consider issues collateral to the appeal. White v. State of 
Utah, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1990). A trial court also has 
the authority to consider applications for attorney's fees and 
matters relating to supersedeas bonds and the modification of 
injunctions during the pendency of an appeal. Venen v. Sweet, 
758 F.2d 117 (3rd Cir. 1985). 
In White, a case relied on by White Pine for its assertion 
the district court lacked jurisdiction defendants brought a 
motion to modify the judgment against them to reflect a credit 
for the amounts they claim to have paid, thereby reducing the 
amount of the Judgment. In holding the trial court had jurisdic-
tion to rule on the motion, the Supreme Court stated: 
An adjudication of the motion, though a 
modification of the judgment may result, 
will not affect the legal issues raised here 
with respect to attorney's fees and defen-
dant's liability. Under these circumstanc-
es, we see no need to suspend our jurisdic-
tion while the district court has the matter 
under consideration as that will only delay 
proceedings. . . . If the motion is grant-
ed, the trial court in this case need only 
advise this court that the judgment has been 
modified. The district court action grant-
ing or denying the motion and the modified 
judgment should be included in the record 
when it is prepared for review by this 
court. 
Id. at 4. 
Other jurisdictions considering the matter have determined 
that a trial court is not deprived of the power to require an 
additional injunction bo^d or the power to dissolve such an 
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injunction upon failure to file a bond and have specifically 
found that a trial court retains jurisdiction to test the 
sufficiency of an appeal bond. In Porter v. Superior Court, 78 
Cal. App. 790, 248 P. 1077 (Cal. 1926), a motion to increase the 
amount of an injunction bond as a condition of keeping the 
injunction in force was filed in the trial court after an appeal 
had been perfected. The Court stated: 
As the jurisdiction of respondent court to 
increase the amount of the undertaking 
before the appeal was taken from the judg-
ment was plainly existent, and as the appeal 
did not transfer to the appellate tribunal 
the matters incident to the giving of the 
undertaking, it appears plain to us that 
respondent court has jurisdiction, despite 
the appeal, to order an increase in the 
amount of the undertaking, even though the 
final result may be that the injunction will 
be set aside for a failure to give the new 
undertaking. There is as great danger to 
the rights of defendant in the action from 
an insufficiency of the undertaking, which 
insufficiency appears after the appeal, as 
from an insufficiency which might have 
appeared before the appeal. Under such 
circumstances, the jurisdiction to order a 
sufficient undertaking must rest somewhere, 
and, as it does not reside in the appellate 
tribunal after the appeal, it must still 
abide in the superior court. 
Id. at 1078. 
In Osborn v. Riley, 331 So.2d 268 (Ala. 1976), the Alabama 
Supreme Court held a motion for additional supersedeas bond was 
collateral to the issues which had been appealed. 
[T]he Rileys1 motion for an additional 
supersedeas bond is part of a proceeding 
that is separate and distinct from the 
decree appealed from. The question present-
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ed by the Rileys1 motion, that is, whether 
the original $5,000 supersedeas bond ade-
quately protected the Rileys1 interest in 
the court1s order entered in their favor, 
does not involve the rights and equities 
relative to the question of whether their 
deed should have been set aside. The 
Rileys1 motion does not raise any question 
going behind the decree appealed from, nor 
does it raise any question decided by that 
decree. In short, the Rileys1 motion pre-
sented a question which is clearly collater-
al to the questions raised by Osborn's 
appeal of the court order setting aside the 
deed. 
Id, at 272. The court further recognized the trial court's 
jurisdiction to rightfully make orders that are needful for the 
preservation of the res and the rights of the parties pending to 
the appeal. "So it is that the Rileys1 motion for additional 
bond involved a matter necessary for the full protection of their 
rights pending Osborn's appeal . . . ." Id. White Pine's appeal 
of this issue is disturbing, to say the least, since both this 
Court and the Utah Supreme Court have, in effect, told White Pine 
that jurisdiction of the bonding issue is in the district court. 
White Pine cites the case of In re: Federal Facilities 
Realty Trust, 227 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1955), for the proposition 
that a district court has no power to revoke a stay once an 
appeal has been taken. The holding of that case, however, has 
been criticized and appears to have been abrogated by Rule 8(a), 
Fed. R. APP. P. . which requires "application for a stay of a 
judgment or order of a district court pending appeal, or for 
approval of a supersedeas bond, or for an order suspending, 
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modifying, restoring granting an injunction during the pendency 
of an appeal must ordinarily be made in the first instance in the 
district court," (Emphasis added.) Rule 8, Utah R. App. P. is 
substantially similar to Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P. and appears to 
recognize the reality that an appellate court is ill-equipped to 
take evidence or make factual determinations as to the sufficien-
cy of a supersedeas bond, as the Utah Supreme Court and this 
Court so held with these parties. Swasev v. Rocky Point Ditch 
Co. , 649 P.2d 1 (Utah 1982) (decided under former Utah R. Civ. P. . 
Rule 73). 
If the appellate court cannot take evidence, and, as White 
Pine asserts, the district court has no jurisdiction, the 
illogical result is that a judgment holder is left with no forum 
in which his security will be protected, even if, subsequent to 
the filing of the appeal, the security is lost, destroyed, or 
devalued, an absurd result. 
In In re: Long. 93 Br. 791 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1988), the court 
noted that the holding of Federal Facilities had been incorporat-
ed into former Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(e). The court noted: 
The former rule's provision that the docket-
ing of an appeal divests the lower court of 
jurisdiction to address matters relating to 
the bond or to a stay pending appeal was 
rejected when Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules 
of Appellate Procedure was adopted. The 
advisory committee note to Rule 8(a) states: 
The requirement of FRCP 73(e) appears 
to be a concession to the view that 
once an appeal is perfected, the dis-
trict court loses all power over its 
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judgment. See In re; Federal Facili-
ties Realty Trust. 227 F.2d 651 (7th 
Cir. 1955) and cases cited at 654-655. 
No reason appears why all questions 
related to supersedeas or the bond for 
costs on appeal should not be presented 
in the first instance to the district 
court in the ordinary case. 
In re: Long, 93 Br. at 791. See also Venen v. Sweet. 758 F.2d 
117 (3rd Cir. 1985)(district court, during the pendency of an 
appeal is not divested of jurisdiction to determine an applica-
tion for attorney's fees or to issue orders regarding the filing 
of bonds or supersedeas bonds or to modify, restore or grant 
injunctions). 
As noted above, in order to determine the damages which 
would accrue during the pendency of White Pine's appeal and the 
sufficiency and amount of the bond to be posted by White Pine, 
the district court was required to make a determination of the 
amount of attorney's fees incurred by the Sharps, since attor-
ney's fees are an integral part of damages incurred by the stay 
of execution. Cf. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin, 
Wright & Miles. 681 P.2d 1258# 1262 (Utah 1984). 
Here, the award of additional attorney's fees is collateral 
to the issues raised in White Pine's first appeal. In Finst 
Div., Inc. v. Bermaor, 449 So.2d 290, 291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1983) , the court held that the mere fact a first judgment was on 
appeal did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to enter 
a subsequent judgment for attorney's fees, stating: 
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A proceeding seeking attorneys1 fees and 
costs pursuant to the primary judgment is 
not a proceeding to enforce the primary 
judgment, and a supersedeas of such primary 
judgment does not, any more than the appeal 
therefrom, divest the trial court of juris-
diction to entertain such proceeding, to 
enter the ancillary judgment, and to provide 
for its enforcement unless such ancillary 
judgment is independently superseded. 
(Footnote omitted.) Id. See also Dent v. Simmons, 61 Md. App. 
122, 485 A.2d 270 (1985)(Trial court has jurisdiction to award 
attorney's fees after appeal of the case in chief; determination 
of issue within the sound discretion of the trial court); Venen 
v. Sweet. 758 F.2d at 120 (3rd Cir. 1985)(district court during 
pendency of an appeal is not divested of jurisdiction to 
determine an application for attorney's fees). 
POINT IV 
SUPPLEMENTATION OF THE JUDGMENT BY 
THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED 
BY THE SHARPS IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE 
JUDGMENT NOR THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT. 
In Utah where provided for by contract, the award of 
attorney's fees is left to the sound discretion of the trial 
court. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 
1988); Turtle Mat, v. Haggis Mat.. 645 P.2d 677 (Utah 1982). 
When the terms of the contract are determined to provide for an 
award of attorney's fees, they are to be awarded as a matter of 
legal right. Saunders v. Sharp. 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 68, 79 (Utah 
Ct. App. May 25, 1990). In its first appeal, White Pine argued, 
also, that the award of attorney's fees in the first Judgment was 
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improper. This Court, however, rejected that contention stating: 
"Based on the court's determination that buyers breached the 
trust deed, trust deed note, and the contract, the trial court 
properly ruled that sellers were entitled to their attorney fees 
[sic] reasonably incurred.11 Saunders at 70. The trial court 
then concluded: "At the court's instruction, sellers' counsel 
submitted an affidavit and supporting documents as evidence of 
reasonableness. We perceive no abuse of discretion in the trial 
court's determination that this affidavit, never rebutted, was 
sufficient to support an award of fees. Id. The Sharps' counsel 
followed the same procedure for the second award of fees. (R. 
1791-1885) 
White Pine argues in its Brief that somehow the Judgment 
limits the areas in which the Sharps can recover attorney's fees, 
ignoring, totally, the underlying Agreement upon which the 
Judgment is based. In this case, the attorney's fees can be 
awarded because they are authorized by the contractual terms to 
which White Pine agreed. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 
985, 988 (Utah 1988)(Citing Golden Key Realty. Inc. v. Mantos, 
699 P.2d 730, 734 (Utah 1985)). Contractual obligations to pay 
attorney's fees incurred in enforcing a contract include fees 
incurred on appeal. Redevelopment Agency v. Dasakalas. 119 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 70 (Utah App. October 11, 1989); Cobabe v. Crawford, 
780 P.2d 834, 837 (Utah App. 1989); Management Servs. v. 
Development Assocs.. 617 P.2d 406, 408-09 (Utah 1980). 
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The Trust Deed, the Trust Deed Note and the Memo, comprising 
the parties1 Agreement in this case, all include clauses relating 
to awards of attorney's fees. 
Three separate provisions of the Trust Deed alone provide 
for the recovery of attorney's fees. (Ex. 2, Add. 7-8) Para-
graph 6 provides that the beneficiary (Sharps) "may commence, 
appear in and defend any action . . . and . . . employ counsel, 
and pay his reasonable fees." Paragraph 7 then requires trustor 
(White Pine Ranches) to "pay immediately" "all sums expended 
hereunder by Beneficiary," especially including sums expended in 
paragraph 6. Finally, under paragraph 16, the Sharps are 
entitled to "foreclose the Trust Deed [and] . . . recover in such 
proceeding all costs and expenses incident therein, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee." 
The Trust Deed Note provides that if it "is collected by an 
attorney after default . . . the undersigned [White Pine Ranches] 
. . . agree to pay . . . a reasonable attorney's fee." (Ex. 3, 
Add. 10) 
Finally, under the Memo, paragraph 11, "the defaulting party 
shall pay all expenses of enforcing the same or any right arising 
out of breach or default, including reasonable attorney's fees, 
whether incurred with or without suit and before and after 
Judgment." (Emphasis added.) (Ex. 15, Add. 14) 
White Pine seems to assert that the language in the Judgment 
"and after prevailing in any appeal" somehow limits the recovery 
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of fees in the interim. The word "and" is used to connect words 
or phrases expressing the idea that the latter is to be added or 
taken along with the first in addition to that which immediately 
precedes. 3A CJS "And" (1979). Accordingly, the phrase "and 
after prevailing in any appeal" as stated in the Judgment is in 
addition to the other phrases "preparation of the Findings11, 
"responding to any post-trial motions", and "collecting said 
Judgment" and not intended as a limitation to the language 
contained in the parties1 Agreement. 
This Court recently dealt with the scope of enforcement of 
a contract for which attorney's fees are recoverable. In 
Dasakalas, supra, the Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City 
condemned certain property in which tenants held a leasehold 
interest. The tenants made a claim for a portion of the 
condemnation award asserting they had a compensable interest in 
the property, which claim the owners contested. The trial court 
granted the owners1 motion for summary judgment and ordered the 
tenants to pay the owners1 attorney's fees pursuant to the terms 
of the lease agreements which provided as follows: 
Lessee also agrees to pay all costs and 
attorney's fees and expenses that shall 
arise from enforcing the terms and provision 
of this lease. 
This Court held that the owners were contractually entitled to 
the award of attorney's fees, stating: 
Owners successfully resisted their [the Ten-
ants] claim for compensation on the grounds 
that it was a violation of the "terms and 
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provisions of this lease". Thus the Owners 
are contractually entitled to collect attor-
ney's fees and expenses incurred in defend-
ing against Tenants' claims because they 
were enforcing the lease terms. 
Id. at 77. 
In this case, the attorney's fees incurred post-judgment 
(all of which have been paid in full by the Sharps as of 
November 30, 1989, see Affidavit of Kathy A. F. Davis (R. 2050, 
2052)) have arisen out of or are a result of the breach or 
default of White Pine, and have been incurred in enforcing the 
rights of the Sharps under the terms of the contract by success-
fully resisting the claims asserted by White Pine in its 
Complaint and on appeal. Redevelopment Agency v. Dasakalas. 119 
Utah Adv. Rep. 70 (Utah App. October 11, 1989) . Indeed, 
appellants' objections to the fees are a reflection of how 
litigious they are. The Sharps have been required, over the past 
four years, to litigate, defend and relitigate this matter in 
four separate forums and, now, twice in this Court. 
J. Richard Rees claims an interest in the subject property 
(Ex. 46) and in order to proceed with a foreclosure of the 
property, it was necessary to obtain the release from the 
bankruptcy he filed of that interest in the property.3 In order 
3In fact, it was Robert Felton, one of the plaintiffs 
herein, who filed an Objection to defendants' Motion for Relief 
from the Automatic Stay in the Rees Bankruptcy, which Objection 
will necessitate further legal action. Copies of the Order 
Modifying the Automatic Stay and Feltonfs Objection are attached 
hereto collectively as Addendum 11. 
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to obtain clear title to the property and successfully complete 
a foreclosure, it was necessary to obtain consents to judgment 
from junior lienholders. 
The other categories to which White Pine objects, including 
drafting letters to California counsel regarding prospective 
buyers, preparing for and attending conferences regarding the 
development of White Pine Ski Resort and having telephone 
conversations about an interested buyer are all categories 
excluded from the award of attorney's fees in paragraph 3(a) of 
the Amended Order and taken under advisement by the district 
court. (R. 2200) 
CONCLUSION 
The Sharps agree they cannot compound interest and deny the 
Amended Order has that effect. Further, the Sharps have filed a 
Motion to amend the Amended Order and delete the language which 
White Pine finds objectionable. The issue of whether the 
district court could properly vacate a stay of execution has been 
rendered moot by the Stipulation of the parties. The district 
court has jurisdiction to supplement the Judgment by the amounts 
which continue to accrue on the obligation during the pendency of 
the appeal as well as to determine the sufficiency of the 
supersedeas bond which was security for the stay of execution. 
Attorney's fees are an item of damages included in the recovery 
under a supersedeas bond and the trial court appropriately 
considered attorneyfs fees in fixing the amount of the supersede-
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as bond and supplementing the Judgment. Based upon the forego-
ing, the Sharps respectfully submit that the Amended Order 
entered by the trial court should be affirmed. 
DATED this day of November, 1990. 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
Dohaldx^/TTT indei 
Kathy'A/1 F. Davis 
Attorneys for Appellees Sharp 
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Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment m favor 
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of defendants in an action for breach of con-
tract and slander of title. Plaintiffs also appeal 
the district court's determination that a tem-
porary restraining order was wrongfully 
issued, entitling defendants to damages from 
injunction bonds posted by, and on behalf of, 
plaintiffs. We affirm the judgment on the 
contract, but reverse the award of damages 
against the injunction bonds. 
This dispute arises from the sale of appro-
ximately 60 acres of land near Park City, 
Utah, owned by John C. and Geraldine Y. 
Sharp ("sellers"). Plaintiff White Pine 
Ranches, a general partnership consisung of 
Leon H. Saunders, Robert Felton, Kenneth R. 
Norton, and Paul H. Landes ("buyers"), 
purchased the property on July 16, 1981, for 
the purpose of construcung a "Planned Unit 
Development" (PUD)2 of four- or five-acre 
lots and an internal roadway. Buyers paid 
$620,000 down on a total purchase price of 
SI,583,055.30, and executed a mist deed and 
note providing for equal annuah installment 
payments of S192,611.06 on the balance due. 
An "Offer to Purchase" and "Memorandum 
of Closing Terms" were also executed 
(hereafter referred to as the "contract"), and 
included the following provisions: (1) upon 
receipt of the down payment ana recordauon 
of a "PUD Plat and Deciarauon of Coven-
ants, Condiuons and Restrictions," three lots 
of buyers' choice together with the internal 
roadway connecting the lots to the county 
road would be released from the trust deed; 
(2) after recordauon and upon receipt of each 
5140,000 in principal, one PUD lot of buyers' 
choice would be released from the trust deed; 
(3) sellers would grant Summit County a strip 
of land to widen the county road, or, if the 
road was shown to be inaccurately platted, to 
grant to the county the road as it existed; (4) 
I sellers would warrant marketable utie subject 
only to easements and reservations of record; 
(5) buyers would provide sellers with a water 
and sewer connecuon at a pro rata cost, at 
such time as the connections became available; 
(6) buyers would sell 50 acre-feet of irriga-
tion water to sellers for the discounted cost of 
$100,000 cash; (7) buyers would be responsible 
for ail taxes and assessments after assuming 
possession of the premises; (8) failure to make 
the annual installment payments within thirty 
days of the annual anniversary date would 
consutute a default; and (9) m the event of a 
breach or default, the defaulting party would 
pay all expenses, including reasonable attorney 
fees, incurred in enforcing any obligauon or 
right under the contract. 
Buyers made installment payments in 1982, 
1983, 1984, and a partial payment in 1985. 
Buyers also made certain improvements to the 
property and the internal roadway at a cost of 
over a million dollars, funded m pan by a 
construction loan from Tracy Collins Bank & 
Trust Company ("Tracv Collins"). On or 
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about November 23, 1983, sellers executed a 
"Consent to Record" with respect to buyers' 
plat describing "Phase I" of the project, which 
involved six lots and the roadway. The piat 
and a "Declaration of Protective Covenants" 
were officially recorded on December 23, 
1983. The plat indicated that the internal 
roadway was to be private, in contravention of 
sellers' intent to have the roadway dedicated 
to pubiic use. 
Although sellers requested the trustee on 
January 18, 1984, to release and reconvey lots 
1 through 5, no mention of the roadway was 
made, and no reconveyance was recorded until 
March 28, 1986. Meanwhile, property taxes 
for lot 6 and the unplatted property became 
due on November 30, 1984. Of the $4,725 
assessed for taxes, buyers paid only 51,515.24. 
Buyers aiso paid only a portion of the instal-
lment payment due in June 1985. 
Sellers subsequently recorded a notice of 
default on September 16, 1985, and gave 
notice of a trustee's sale of lot 6, the internal 
roadway, and ail the unplatted property. 
Buyers filed this action on September 4, 1986, 
the day before the scheduled trustee's sale, 
and were granted an order temporarily restr-
aining the sale. The initial temporary restrai-
ning order required a cash bond in the amount 
of 52,400, which buyers posted. The parties 
thereafter stipulated to an injunction pending 
trial, and the district court imposed a 550,000 
injunction bond. The bond was posted by 
Tracy Collins acting as surety for buyers, in 
an attempt to protect its security interest on 
the construction loan issued to buyers. 
In their complaint, buyers sought specific 
performance of certain obligations under the 
contraa. specifically, the release of lot 6, the 
internal roadway, and 7.35 acres of the unpl-
atted property. Buyers also sought damages 
arising from sellers' alleged breach of cont-
ract. Sellers counterclaimed, asserting that 
buyers had breached the contract. They sought 
dissolution of the injunction, damages for its 
wrongful issuance, an order of judicial forec-
iosure on the property, and recovery on the 
:rust deed note. 
A bench trial was held on January 28-29 
ind Marcn 22-25, 1988. The trial court held 
hat buyers had materially breached the cont-
ract by failing to pay property taxes on lot 6 
ind the unplatted acreage, and by failing to 
.atisfy their 1985 md 1986 installment oblig-
ations. The court .urther held that the contr-
ictual breach occurred before any alleged 
>reach by sellers, and that further perform-
nce by sellers was excused after buyers' 
Teach. Buyers aiso failed to request release of 
ots until after their own breach had already 
ccurred, facts which the court believed affe-
ted the credibility of buyers' claims. In con-
rast, sellers were found to have substantially 
ompiied with the terms of the contraa, and 
tat the recordation of the Declaration of 
Proteaive Covenants and the Consent to 
Record constituted a release of the roadway. 
Judgment was entered for sellers in the 
amount of 5759,415.63. This amount included 
5144,088.75 in attorney fees, which were 
awarded under the terms of the trust deed and 
note and the contraa. 
After finding that buyers had breached the 
contraa. the trial court determined that the 
temporary restraining order against sellers had 
been wrongfully issued. The court then dete-
rmined that the appraised fair market value of 
the property upon which sellers were entitled 
to foreclose was 5728,445. That sum was 
deduaed from the total judgment, leaving 
sellers undersecured in the amount of 
530,970.63. The court awarded sellers that 
amount against the bonds by entering judg-
ment on the 52,400 cash bond, in full, and 
528,570.63 against the bond posted by Tracy 
Collins. The court aiso determined that four 
percent of the attorney fees incurred in 
defense of the lawsuit could be attributed to 
defending against the wrongfully issued inju-
nction, and awarded attorney fees against the 
bonds in the amount of 55,763.55. Buyers and 
the surety have brought this consolidated 
appeal to challenge the respective judgments 
against them. 
We first consider the appeal brought by 
buyers, who argue that the trial court erred in 
concluding that they, not sellers, breached the 
contraa. Buyers claim entitlement to specific 
performance and damages, and argue .that 
sellers are precluded from recovering attorney 
fees. Buyers aiso claim that the tnai court 
erred in concluding that they granted to sellers 
an easement over the roadway and that the 
temporary restraining order had been wrong-
fully issued. 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
At the conclusion of trial, the court made 
oral findings encompassing eight transcribed 
pages. Thereafter, the court issued its judg-
ment accompanied by 104 separate findings of 
faa. Buyers' bnef lists over two pages of 
issues and subissues. Although buyers state 
that "the issues presented in this appeal are 
questions of law reviewable by an appellate 
court for correctness," we conclude, after 
scrutinizing those issues, that buyers are esse-
ntially challenging the trial court's findings of 
faa. 
Buyers argue that sellers breached the con-
traa by failing to make all the required reco-
nveyances and that this breach was never 
excused by buyers' failure to make specific 
requests for those releases. Buyers aiso dispute 
the tnai court's finding that the evidence 
"established that the parties by both mutual 
intent and agreement granted to the Defend-
ants the use of the roadway." Buyers further 
contest the finding that sellers substantially 
performed their obligations under the com-
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ract. All of these "legal issues," however, 
strike at the trial court's determination of 
whether there was a material breach of cont-
ract, and if so, when, and by whom. Such 
questions constitute issues of fact for the fact 
finder. See Sjoberg v. Kravik, 759 P.2d 966, 
969 (Mont. 1988); Wasserburger v. American 
Scientific Chem., Inc., 267 Or. 77, 514 P.2d 
1097, 1099 (1973) (en banc); see also American 
Petronna Co. v. D & L Oil Supply, Inc., 283 
Or. 183, 583 P.2d 521, 528 (1978) (substantial 
performance under a contract is a question of 
fact). 
Our standard for overturning factual find-
ings is a rigorous one—we may not set aside 
such findings unless they are clearly erroneous. 
Sweeney Land Co. v. Kimball, 786 P.2d 760, 
761 (Utah 1990); Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). To 
establish clear error, "la)n appellant must 
marshal the evidence in suppon of the find-
ings and then demonstrate that despite this 
evidence, the trial court's findings are so 
lacking in support as to be 'against the clear 
weight of the evidence,' ...." In re Bartell, 776 
P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). This 
burden "is a heavy one, reflective of the fact 
that we do not sit to retry cases submitted on 
disputed facts." Id. at 886. Accordingly, when 
an appellant fails to carry its burden of mar-
shaling the evidence, "we refuse to consider 
the merits of challenges to the findings and 
accept the findings as valid." Mountain States 
Broadcasting Co. v. Ncaic, 783 P.2d 551, 553 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
We are thus obliged to consider the findings 
from the standpoint of the supporting evid-
ence and not from "appellant's view of the 
way he or she believes the facts should have 
been found." Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 
150 (Utah 1987). Since buyers have not mar-
shaled the evidence in support of those find-
ings, but merely argue that there is evidence 
contradicting them, they have failed to dem-
onstrate that the findings are against the clear 
weight of the evidence. We must therefore 
accept the findings as valid and affirm the 
judgment. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
With respect to the award of attorney fees, 
"the court may award reasonable fees in acc-
ordance with the terms of the parties' agree-
ment." Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 
836 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Trayner v. 
Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984) {per 
curiam)). Although the interpretation of una-
mbiguous contractual terms is a question of 
law to which the trial court's ruling is affo-
rded no particular deference on appeal, Wilbum 
v. Interstate Bee, 748 P.2d 582, 584-
85 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), cert, dismissed, 774 
P.2d 1149 (Utah 1989), when those terms are 
determined to provide for an award of atto-
rney fees, they are to be "awarded as a matter 
v. Sharp' CODE«CQ 
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| of legal right." Cobabe, 780 P.2d at 836 
(quoting Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 
625 (Utah 1985)). 
The contract provides that "the defaulting 
party shall pay all expenses of enforcing the 
same or any right arising out of breach or 
default thereof, including reasonable attor-
neys' fees, whether incurred with or without 
suit and both before and after judgment." We 
conclude, as the trial court implicitly did, that 
this provision is unambiguous. Based on the 
court's determination that buyers breached the 
trust deed, trust deed note, and the contract, 
the trial court properly ruled that sellers were 
entitled to their attorney fees reasonably inc-
urred. See, e.g., Dixon v. Stoddard, 165 P.2d 
879, 881 (Utah 1988). 
The amount of such an award is within the 
trial court's discretion, Cobabe, 780 P.2d at 
836, but must be reasonable, Canyon Country 
Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 420 (Utah 
1989), and supported by adequate evidence. 
Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226, 1233 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). At the court's instruction, 
sellers' counsel submitted an affidavit and 
supporting documents as evidence of reason-
ableness. We perceive no abuse of discretion 
in the trial court's determination that this 
affidavit, never rebutted, was sufficient to 
suppon an award of fees. See id.; see also 
Freed Fin. Co. v. Stoker Motor Co., 537 P.2d 
1039,1040 (Utah 1975). 
THE INJUNCTION BONDS 
The Commissioner of Financial Institutions 
("Commissioner"), as receiver for Tracy 
Collins, appeals the judgment against the inj-
unction bonds. The Commissioner seeks to 
avoid liability by arguing for the first time on 
appeal that the posting of the surety bond was 
an ultra vires act by Tracy Collins. 
Although issues not raised below cannot 
generally be considered on appeal, see James 
v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987), the Commissioner urges us to create an 
I exception to this rule under the theory of 
"adverse domination." This theory provides 
that as long as a corporation is controlled or 
"dominated" by wrongdoers against whom a 
cause of action exists, the statute of limitat-
ions is toiled because the wrongdoers cannot 
be expected to bring an action against thems-
elves. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hudson, 
673 F. Supp. 1039, 1042 (D. Kan. 1987). 
Because Tracy Collins did not have the 
power to act as a surety, the Commissioner 
alleges, the bank's officers would have been 
subjected to liability had they asserted the 
ultra vires claim at trial. Therefore, so the 
argument goes, the Commissioner, as receiver, 
should now be permitted under the theory of 
adverse domination to assert the claim of ultra 
vires on appeal. 
Although there are exceptions to the rule 
prohibiting consideration of issues for the first 
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time on appeal, they are few in number. See 
State v. Webb, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 41, 47-
48 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (e.g., exceptional 
circumstances, piam error, liberty interests).- it 
appears that such exceptions are to be applied 
only when gross injustice resulting from app-
lication of the rule overwhelms its purpose-
that being to correct errors at trial, avoiding 
"a merry-go-round of litigation." Bundy v. 
Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 
1984) (quoting Simpson v. General Motors 
Corp., 24 Utah 2d 301, 303, 470 P.2d 399, 401 
(Utah 1970)). 
The Commissioner has brought to our att-
ention no exceptional circumstance to support 
the carving out of yet another exception to the 
rules of appellate review. Although the Com-
missioner urges us to adopt its approach by 
noting that it was not a party below, buyers 
were likewise deprived of the opportunity to 
submit the ultra vires issue to the trial court 
and have it resolved without the necessity of 
this appeal. Since the Commissioner offers no 
authority for extending the theory of adverse 
domination beyond the limitation of actions 
against corporate wrongdoers, and we see no 
other reason to do so, we decline to consider 
its claim of ultra vires. Accord Wallace Bank 
& Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 40 Idaho 
712, 237 P. 284, 287 (1925) (ultra vires may 
not be asserted for the first time on appeal). 
We next address the Commissioner's claim 
that the trial court improperiy awarded atto-
rney fees incurred in resisting the temporary 
restraining order. The trial court accepted 
sellers' calculation that four percent of their 
total attorney fees of $144,088.75 were spent 
defending against the "injunction."3 The trial 
court then awarded 55,763.55 of those fees 
against the bonds. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(c) provides that: 
Except as otherwise provided by 
law, no restraining order or preli-
minary injunction shall issue except 
upon the giving of security by the 
applicant, in such sum as the court 
deems proper, for the payment of 
such costs and damages as may be 
incurred or suffered by any party 
who is found to have been wrong-
fully enjoined or restrained. 
Our supreme court has determined that 
"damages" subject to recovery under this rule 
include the attorney fees of the party wrong-
fully enjoined. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. 
Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 
P.2d 1258, 1262 (Utah 1984). We have since 
extended that recovery to attorney fees incu-
rred as the result of a wrongfully issued tem-
porary restraining order. See Beard v. 
Dugdale, 741 P.2d 968, 969 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). When attorney fees are incurred in 
defending against wrongfully obtained injun-
ctive relief and also against an underlying 
lawsuit, it is appropriate to determine how 
much of the total fees are attributable to res-
isting the injunction. See id.; see also Artistic 
Hairdressers, Inc. v. Levy, 87 Nev. 313, 486 
P.2d 482, 484 (1971) (only the attorney fees 
directly related to dissolution of the wrongful 
injunction are recoverable). We therefore 
affirm the trial court's award of attorney fees 
against the bonds. 
We last address the Commissioner's argu-
ment that the trial court used an incorrect 
measure in awarding damages under rule 
65A(c) against the injunction bonds. The trial 
court calculated damages by adding principal 
($371,739.35), interest (5203,664.50), late fees 
(514,869.57), taxes (520,368.62), attorney fees 
(5144,469.75), trustee's fees (51,803.80), and 
costs (52,881.04) for a total of 5759,796.63. 
The court next considered the testimony at 
trial of a real property appraiser who deter-
mined that the fair market value of the unc-
onveyed property was 517,500 to 520,000 per 
acre at the time the temporary restraining 
order was imposed. The trial court then found 
that the value of the property on the date of 
judgment was 520,000 per acre, totalling 
5728,445.00. Since the value of the property as 
collateral was less than the total judgment, the 
trial court found that buyers were undersec-
ured and awarded the difference (530,970.63) 
as damages for the wrongfully issued iniunc-
tion. 
The Commissioner claims that this calcula-
tion was erroneous, and asserts that the 
correct measure of damages is "'the reduction 
or diminution in the value of the security 
during the period of restraint." Glens Falls 
Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 83 Nev. 196, 427 
P.2d 1, 4 (1967). See also Global Contact 
Lens, Inc. v. Knight, 254 So. 2d 807, 809 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1971). We agree. Although 
sellers were restrained from foreclosing the 
property for approximately two years, they 
retained both the trust deed note and the 
unconveyed property during that time. The 
trial court found that the value of the property 
did not diminish in those two years. Any 
measure of damages other than a comparison 
of the fair market value of the property before 
and after the injunction is thus incorrect. 
Sellers argue, however, that buyers' argu-
ment ignores the concept of "present value." 
They contend that the award of interest under 
the judgment is inadequate, under the assu-
mption that they would have had available the 
interest earning capacity of the foreclosure sale 
proceeds had the sale been held as scheduled. 
Alternatively, they suggest that an appraisal 
showing the value of the property in 1988 to 
be the same as that in 1986 actually represents 
a decrease in value when the effect of inflation 
is taken into account. Aside from the specul-
ative nature of such claims, sellers' interest 
losses on the trust deed note were taken into 
consideration and awarded as part of the total 
nnna 
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judgment. Interest was awarded at the rate of 
twelve percent on the unpaid principal, eigh-
teen percent on the payments m default, and 
also included a four percent late payment 
cnarge. Surely those charges more than com-
pensated sellers for the interest-beanng pot-
ential of money or the effects of inflation 
aunng the two-year penod. 
In anv event., the Commissioner is correct m 
asserting that "recoverable damages under 
such a bond are those tnat arise from the 
operation of tne injunction itself and not from 
damages occasioned by the suit independently 
of the injunction.* Beard, 741 P.2d at 969 
(quoting Lever Bros. Co. v. International 
Chem. Workers Union, 554 T2d 115, 120 (4th 
Cir. 1976)). On that basis, the interest accrued 
on the trust deed note during the delay m the 
sale of the property mav be awarded in the 
judgment, as was done in this case, but cannot 
also be artnouted as damages under the inju-
nction bond. See Glens Falls, 427 P.2d at 4. 
Since sellers did not aemonstrate any damages 
attributable to the imposition of the injunction 
other than a portion of their attorney fees, the 
award of damages against the bonds must be 
reversed. 
In summary, we affirm the judgment on the 
coxnraa. We reverse the award of damages 
against the injunction bonds, except for the 
attorney fees. Such fees are to be assessed 
against the bonds m a proportion to be dete-
rmined by the trial court. 
Affirmed m part, reversed m part, and 
remanded. No costs awarded. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Pameia T. Greenwood, Judge 
John Fan* Larson, Judge 
1. John Fair Larson, Senior Juvenile Court Judge, 
sitting by special appointment pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-3-24(10) (Supp. 1989). 
1. "Planned unit development' is generally defmed 
as a private residential development on acreage of 
certain minimum size, usuallv large enougn to con-
stitute a new commumry See Srevens v Essex 
Junction Zoning Bd., 139 Vt 297, 428 A.2d HOG, 
1103(1981) 
3. The reierence to an 'injunction* appears to refer 
to both the temporary restraining order and the 
stipulated preliminary injunction. 
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TRUST DEED 
WUh Aasignmeni oi JUats 
THIS TRUST DEED, msda this 2QJ±L_dsy of ,^T^» , i « t 
W w ~ W TOTT. IT T W ^ , T R T O . ^T?!rWr T7TW W g ^ I H E ^ _ 
SnaKbTaas SENiaiS. 3 * 2 . . aa t c n a n t a i n gnitmon
 M TRUSTOR, 
whoso address is 44 Scfcanoe P lace . S a l t l ake d » y . Utah 
l f l l l l l H i I H l l l t iGtVt 
_ASbc;iiAi^ u T^SZ cagwy
 M TRUSTEE/ and 
33M C, SI*KP and GSSM22DIS Y. SHaKP ^
 M BENEFIC2ARY, 
WITNESSETH: That Tmstor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, 
WITH POWER OF SALS, ihm Wowm* described property, situated in **<•—*+> 
County, State oi UUiu 
SEE SXHJBIT *X* JfflSCSED HSSTO AND BY 2SXS SE5E32E2 JNC2RPQRKE2D HESE2X. 
Together with ail buddings, fixture! and improvement! thereon and ail water rights, rights of 
way, aaaements, rentx, issues, profit*, income, tenements* herediiMmentx. pnvdeges ano appurtenances 
thereunto belonging, now or heresiter used or en?oyed with said prooerty, or any part thereof 
SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority herexnaiter riven to and conferred upon 
Benerinary to coded and appiy aucn rents, issues, and profits; 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment oi the indebtedness evidenced by a pro* 
nusaory note of even date herewith, in the prmcpai sum of T **~*, ***• 10 made by 
Trustor, payable to the order oi Benerinary at the tunes, in the manner ano with interest as themn 
set forth, and any extensions ano/or renewaia or modifications thereof: (2) the performance of 
seen agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of aucn additional loans or advance* aa 
hereafter may I* made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, wnen evidenced by a promissory 
note or notes reciting thai they are secured by this Trust Deed; and (A) the payment of aU sums 
expended or advanced by Bemtnnsry under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest 
thereoo as herein provided, 
•NCTTE: Tnatfaa aaa* be a n i ihw ef the Utah State Bay; a beak, beildiae sad least , • 
*mi lamm aaaacsauea wUMnud (a aa aaak baeaaea m Utrnhz a oarpacauaa •MJAenseu' <o da « inaa 
ULMA; *t « uue ininraare er aaattact aaaoaar auilaaiiart ta da atcn baaiaMg m Uua, 
TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF THIS TRUST DEED. TRUSTOR AGREES: 
!. To keep said properly in food condition and repair* not to remov* or demolish any building tfnreon, to 
complete or rtrttot* iirmnptiy and in (Oud and workmanlike manner any budding which may be CMisiructed. 
damaged or destroyed liiercon; to comply with *|| la**, c o w n a n u and restrKttrms t t f i i tu i ( su«i property; not 
us commit or j«»nu< «<w»ut lUctcoi; not U» commit, suite* or ^>ero»i any acl »?*>n **>d property >n vM>>ai»>n L4 }*«*? to 
do ail uiher w u which from the character or usa of said property may bo reasonably necessary, tha specific 
anumeratiuna herein nut excluding (he general; and, if tha loan secured hereby or any part thereof la being 06* 
tamed (or U10 purpoee; uf financing eonatructioa of improvements on said property. Tmator further agrees: 
(at To commence construction promptly and lo pursue tame with reasonable dilifvnce (o completion 
In accordance with plana and specification* satisfactory to Beneficiary, and 
(b) To allow Beneficiary La inspect laid property at all times durtnf construction. 
Trust**, upon presentation to it 04 ah sffklavit signed by Brncficiary, setting forth facta showing « default 
by Trustor under this numbered paragraph, 1a authorized to accept aa true and conclusive ail facta and state-
menta therein and to act thereon hereunder. 
2. T o provide and maintain Insurance. of such type or types and amounts as Beneficiary may require, on 
the tmpniwment* now rusting or hereafter erected or pi ACvd on said property Such insurance shall be carried 
in comiKinies spprowd by Beneficiary with !i»ea payable clauses in favor ul and in form uicepiahle to Benefiuary. 
In e w n t of hies. Trustor »IM»II give immediate notice (o Uenritoury. who may make \tnn*i of h#»s, and each insurance 
company concerned is hereby suthortzed and J1 reded to muko payment fur such lose directly 'o Beneficiary 
tns4«*od \A iu l'rusiur JSM! Beneficiary jointly, and the insurance pruweds. <»r any tiart thereof, may \ta sppiicd 
Uy Lionel usury, at its option, to reduction of Use* UMiebtednesa hereuy securvd or to the rvsturatum or repair of 
Use) property dams fed. 
X To deliver to, pay for and maintain with Beneficiary until the Indebtedness secured hereby if paid in full, 
such evidence of title as Beneficiary may require, including abatracta of title or policies of title insurance and 
any extensions or renewals thereof or auppiementa thereto. 
4. To appear in and defend any action or proceedinc purporting to affect the security hereof*, (ho title to 
ae»d property, or the right* or powers of Beneficiary or Truatee: and should Qeneficiary or Trustee fleet (a 
alas) appear in or defend any such action or proceed ins*, lo pay ait coals and expenses, including cost of svt-
uessca oi title and attorney a lees in a reasonable sura incurred by Qeneficiary or Trustee. 
5. T o pay at feast !0 day* before delinquency all taaea and assessments affecting said property, including 
all asaessmsnts upon weter company stock and ail rents, assessment* and charges /or weter. appurtcnent to or 
used in connection with said property; to pay, when due, ail encumbrances, charges, and liana with interest, 
on said property or any part thereof, which at any tune appear to be prior or superior hereto; to pay ail costs, 
fee*, and atpenaes of this Trust, 
f. Should Trustor fail lo msuto any payment or to do any act aa herein provided, then Beneficiary or 
Trusts*, but without •obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor and without 'sieasing 
Trustor from any obligation hereof, may: Make or do the same in such manner and to such extent as aither may 
deesss necessary lo protect the security Hereof. Beneficiary or Trustee: being authorised to enter upon said 
property for such purposes: commence, sppear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to at feet the 
security hereof or tho right* of power* of Beneficiary or Trustee: pay, purchase, contest, or compromise any 
encumbrance, charge or hen which in tho judgment oi either appears (o be prior or superior hereto; and in ex-
ercising any such powers, incur any liabdtty, • spend whatever amounts in it* absolute discretion it may deem 
naceasary therefor, including cost oi evsdenca of* Utie, employ counsel, and pay hta reasonable iawa. 
?. To pay immediately and without demand ail rums expended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trust**, 
w«u* interest from data oi expenditure s i tho rata oi ten par cent (10%) par annum until pasd, and tho repay* 
axaaat thereof1 shall bo secured heresy. 
IT 13 MUTUALLY AGREED THAT: 
8. Should said property or any part thereof bo taken or damaged by reason of any public improvement 
or condemnation proeeeJtng. or damaged by tire, or earthquake, or in any othr>r manner lienettciary snail be 
entitled to ail compensation, awards, snd other payment* or relief therefor, and shall be entitled at it* option 
to commence. aptiear in and prosecute in it* own name, any action or proceedings, or to mske any Comoro* 
mrso or settlement, in connection with such taking or damage. All such compensation, awards damages, rignt* 
of action and proceeds, inducting the proceeds of any policies of fire and other insurance affecting laid property. 
are )t«rehy assigned to Beneftcisry, woo may, aftsr deducting therefrom ail its rxpenses, including sttorney a fees. 
apply the same un any indebtedness secured hereby Trustor agrees to rsecute such further assignment* of any 
compensation, awerd. damages. and right* of action and proceeds as lieneficiary or Trustee may require. 
9. At any time- and from time to tune upon writtten request of Beneficiery, psyment of tls fees and prs-
sentatton of this Trust Deed and the note for endorsement (tn case of fuil reconvevsnee. for canceilstion snd 
retention), without sflectins; the liability of any person for (he psyment of the indebtednese secured hereoy 
Trustee msy (s i consent to the making oi sny man of plat of said property; (b) join in {ranting any rase* 
ment or creating any restriction thereon; (c) join in sny subordination or other screement affecting this Trust Oe«d 
or tho lien or charge thereof, (d) reconvey. without warranty, sil or any pert of said oroperty The frantee in 
any reconvavence msy be described aa Mho person or persons entitled thereto' and tha recitaia therein of any 
matters or facts snail be conciuatve proof of truthfulness thereof. Trustor sgrees to pay ressomtoie Trustees 
fees for s a y of the services mentioned in this paragraph. 
10. As additional security. Trustor hereby assigns Beneficiery. duruig the continusnce of these trust*, ail 
rent*, issues, roysities, and prof its of tha property at f acted by thia Trust Deed and of sny personal property 
located thereon. Untd Trustor thaU default in tha psyment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the per-
formance of any agreement hereunder. Trustor shall have the right to collect ait such rent*, issues, roysities 
snd profit* tsrnad prior to default aa they become due and payable If Trustor ihsit default as aforesaid 
Trustor s right to collect any of tuch moneye shall cease snd lleneliciery shall have the n«ht w*«h or without 
taking poaeeeason of (he property aifected hereby, to collect ail rent*, roysities, issues, snd protils. Failure or 
discontinuance of Beneiiciary at any time or from tuna to tune to collect any such moneys shad not us sny 
manner «ff«ct {ha ««rba«q<rent •nforcrman* by Bener/cra/y oi >be» rtfhi, power, rod amhorny *o cuiiect iha> iw>» 
Noshing contained herein, nor tha «xercis* of tha right by beneficiary to collect, thai! t*e or be construed to 
be. an affirmation by Beneiiciary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor an assumotion of liability under, nor • 
awborduiatson of tha lien or charge of thus Trust Deed to sny sucn tenancy, lease or option. 
11. Upon any default by Trustor hereunder. Beneficiery msy at any tuna without notice, fithcr in 
Barson, by agent, or by s receiver to bo sppointed by s court (Trustor hereby consenting to the sppointment o. eneficiary aa such receiver>, and without regard to tha adequacy of sny security for the indebtedness hereby 
secured, enter upon ami tska possession of i s id property or any part thereof, in its own name sua for or 
otharwtsa ruiiect tasd rent*, issues, at%*a profit* including those pset due and unoasd, and spply (ha tame, less 
cueta ami eapenaee of ofieratton assd collection, including raaaonaliia attorney a fees, upon any indebtedness 
secured hereby, and ba such order aa Beneficiary may drtormina. 
12. The entering upon and taking pnaaaaainw of said property, tha coilecton of such rent*, issues, anc 
profita. or the proceed* of firo and other insurance policies or compensation or swards for sny taking 01 
damage oi tasd property, and the application or release thereof aa aforesaid, shsil not cure or wesve any 
default or notsca of default hereunder or invalidate any set dona pursuant to such notice. 
IX The failure on tha part of Beneficiary to promptly snforc* any right hereunder shsil not opereU a-
a waivar U such right anal tha waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute s waiver of any otl>* 
or subsequent default. 
14. Ttma is of the essence hereof. Upon default by Trustor In tha payment of any indebtedness secured here 
by or us the uerfurmonre of sny agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby shsil immediaieiy become du« 
and payjr.if at tha option of Benefioary in the event of such default Benviicury may cserme or cause Trusle* 
In esevute s written nottte oi defeuit smi of elei tmn tb CJHSS* laid property to I*- v.hl to saiufy the obligation. 
Isare*^. ami 1 ni.u-u kliall die tuvh ru^um f»»r rvcord in each muntv *h«r%in said property or some pert 0. 
parcri thereof is **tisat«-i Ueneiniary MIM* siioil deposit wids Trustee. ih« note and all Ju«.um#nt* evidencing 
SS|*en.iitur«.a secured ):«>.. 1 ) . 
de/suit ami notice of default and notic* U «1« having b««n ftv«n as then required by taw Tfu»**«. without < 
JA Trustor *h.*il >*»! t*u i |>*»*»>' ** ' on the daia ana at lhe time ana place J n i g »«j in «uui nonce of (ate. either at 
a whoi« or MI Mri»*»***ie D^ILL!.. n s u m order aa tt uiay a«uni i ta« (Uu »ut*te any statutory n«ui oi Tru»u>r U> 
direct Ui« order in which •»»*:• .operty. if consisting of sever.*! known lots .»arrets. th^it lie ktmi), at puUic 
auction to the highest bustler, the nurcit*** price u«yabi« in lawful ntoiivr of the Umtni States at the lime of 
sale. Tl»e penon conducting lhe aai* mar. (or any cause he deems expvotent. poatiM>ne th« sale iron time to 
tim* unld >( ahe.it be completed and. in every case, notice of postponement shall be ftven by public declaration 
thereof by such person at lite ume and place last appointed (or lit* sale; provided, il the sale ts postponed 
for tonctr than one day beyond the day designated in the notice oi sal*, noiica thereof thai I be given tn the 
same manner as the original notice of talc. Trustee snail execute and deliver lo the purchaser its Dead con* 
veying aari property so sold, but without any covenant or warranty, express or implied. The recitsia in tha 
Deed oi any matters or facta snail be conciusiv* prooi of the truthfulness thereof. Any person. including Bene* 
iiciary, may bid at th« sain. Trustee shall apply tha proceeds of lhe sale to payment of (1) the eosu and 
expanses ol exercising the power of aaie and of the sale , including tha payment of (he Trustees and attorney I 
fees; (2) cost oi any evidence of Utie procured in connection with such aaie and revenue t>iamps on Trustees Deed; 
(3) ail sums expended under tha terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at 10** omr annum from data 
of expenditure: (4) all other sums then secured heresy, and (5) (he remainder, if sny. to the person or persons 
let ally entitled thereto, or Ui* Trust**, ux its discretion, aaay deposst tha balance oi such proceeds with the County 
Clerk of Lhe county m which tha sale too* place, 
16. Upon tha occurrence at* any default hereunder. Beneficiary shall Have the option to. declare all sums 
secured hereby immediately due and payable and fore d o e * this Trust Deed tn tha manner provided by law 
for the foreclosure oT mortgages on real property and Beneficiary shall be enutled to recover in such proceed* 
tag all costs and expanse* incident thereto, tacit*' duding a raaaonaula attorney's fee tn such amount as shall be 
fixed by tha court. 
17. Bane/kiary may appoint a successor trust** at any time by filing for reeor 1 in the office of the County 
Recorder of each county in wnich said property or soma part Ihereo/ is situated, a substitution of trustee. From 
tha ume tha substitution is filed for record, tha new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority 
and tale of the trustee named herein or ol* sny successor trustee. Each such substitution shall be esecuted and 
acknowledged, and notice thereo** shall be ftven and prool thereof made, m the manner provided by law. 
18. Tiiis Trust Deed shall apply to. inure to tha benefit of. and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees. 
devisees, admtnstrators, esecutors, successors snd assigns. Ail obligations of Trustor hereunder are joint Atui 
several* The term "Ueneficiary" shall mean tha owner and holder, including any pledgee, of the note secured 
hereby. In this Trust Deed, wnenever tha context requires, tha masculine tender includes the feminine and/or 
neuter, and the singular number includes tha plural. 
19. Trustee sccapts this Trust when this Trust Deed , duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public 
record aa provided by law. Trusts* is not obligated to notify sny party hereto of pending sale under any other 
Trust Deed or of any action or proceeding tn watch Trustor, Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless 
brought by Trustee. 
20. This Trust Dead snail be construed sccording to tha laws of tha Stat* of Utah 
oi default and ot* any notice of sale 21. Tha undersigned Trustor requests that a copy at any notice 
hareunder be mailed to him at tha address hereinbefore sat forth. 
Signature of Trustor 
(If Tmator Mn^S^tTx^^T^; 
STATE OF UTAH. 
COUNTY OF ^ g " /—v 
L(a^_d«yof_2^^, On the . 
_, AJ3. 19&JL, personally 
appeared before me ~gi01«Jg«»JUati^^ , 
the signers) of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that ..they., executed the 
same. 
My Commission Empires: 
Notary Public residing at: 
(If Trustor t Corporation) 
STATE OF UTAUt 
COUNTY 0F£*-**T 
On the _ lla~- day of -, AJ3. i. 19 JLL personally 
appeared before me TESSES^B^XEOO^ ... who being by me duly sworn, 
of .^2ntazst2tfca-3eatala r .Jric^ r-taya that he is the Pres ident . 
the corporation that executed the above and foregoing instrument and that said instrument waa 
signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of its by-laws (or by authonty oi a resolution 
of its board of directors) and said KENNE^..£(•.. 
to me that said corporation executed the same. 
My Commission Expires: 
EXHIBIT *AW 
Beginning at a point South 89* 43' 36" Waat along tha North 
line of Lot 3, 175.42 feat from tha corner of Lota 1 and 8, a 
brass cap set by tha U. S. General Land Office, said braaa cap 
also being South 00* 19' 46" Weat along section line 1336.14 
faet from the Northeast corner of Section 1, Township 2 South, 
Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence 
South 89* 43# 36* Weat along the Morth line of Lota 7 and 8 
2948.98 faet to the Northwest corner of Lot 7; thence South 
00V13* 29" Saat along the Weat line of Lot 7, 1312.84 feet to 
the Southweat corner of Lot 7; thenca North 89" 47* 41" Eaat 
along tha South line of Lot 7, 832*67 feet; thenca North 61• 
00« 00" Eaat 195i*.90 faet; thenca North 47* 33' 15" Eaat 
462.75 feet; thenca North 42* 44' 40" Eaat 85.63 feet to the 
point of beginning. 
SUBJECT TO Easements, Encroachments, Restrictions, Rights-of-W 
and matters of record enforceable in law or equity. 
TRUST DEED NOTE 
CO NOT S S n C T WIS KOHi W . , - J . Afc^Mte. - • * Tma 0—J •• , » « .
 M k . 
f - " ' - - - - - - •••-• 
*=* :o ,. ai 
?GX VAU2 12CSTSS, * • i—raaaa-, 'jmmaf md airajm-r,
 ?nmm a ^ « «, 
XHH c. SHAH? «a czaaisrg r. SHAKE*. 
»«a i iurai freaa d»*9 U Q f f i t t •i_1 . . 3 * 2 1 1 . . ' ... par COM (. IZ-^c) ?«* *«•»-» oa 
-amid pnaasm*, u-4 ptiacspa* &aa u u m pafaau ** fa*Jo«*i 
s s ^ccsr^i A S T C S : HL~-JJ AND SY j2iis HSTSSXZ MACS A FAST HZSS-T. 
Zfcdl pBTVMMC IBJ-l ^B aOpljaai & K • « S R M i I u i l B l 0*4. dW W _ £ S « » • 
w c { ---^Tr) MT f n i «ui pa*, aod -ftr*T ba IUS^QCS » * Lisa pcynens ssasga or 4% 
o£ sues cwasiu* sayanc. 
U J T «i 1 mi m mm paraaaau or* mad mgilTmtia ai pcuaaaai *-4 iaurvat or my put saaraai. or m 
4 M ^ T u m m a * a* aarr aa^ aaaMBf minima-1 i* Out 7«£U-t Daaa aananatj &u asu, s » )xoid§x hcraot, u ta 
M O « md iw ina w i n t **? IBMIIIII. a—J danira SB* w i n pnacaaa* Saiinrw aaai acou*- lourw 4uc «a« 
If cbia a m a a-laca* br a* u a » H f -fear akrfa—Ut in SB« a n a w < oi pnaoBai ar iau«nac» anacr *ua 
m vttao-a aut, a s Miiunifnaa, ;OMU*T *a-i w n m i f , ifrwa ta par ul oatu aaai crpasaai « cmltoan iiuin<iinr, 
T^« •"«•"—. auraov. p u n o i o n Mas' a o o n c n hcrro/ **"»~*xdy •-««»« prmmfflCB for parmanc, <dam*ad 
aaW M a n <u 4—aaaor u d aoaoavacm ai sua aocs* u a eaaacac to tar -*i ul ainiMa<u oi time, frar**44. 
vmrp«rs or nnriiiTrTnrr^ i uut caa> bs jruxtm W a « holii«r 5««oi «•<& r«vo«n 19 (At pa%m«at or ocau ptv^ 
-Minn 1 ai ***»» aoa«. md m UU frrrrt si tor Mcursrr, or wry part cserroi, «HA «r ««t£aui Miomtuaort. 
T I M Ht> a aaaarai ^f a Truat Dmrt oi rvaa daaa k i » i a 




XS333JUTCTS* CT dSSTSC TSy.3 
cxacazad Sy JCHH C- SSXX? *ad ZZ3X1ZZXZ T. S2X& (o*raia-
l i t « • S « i l * r * ) , *ad 323X37 m r C H , IZ23 3 - SAZSETaS, CTHS3 
X. SCSrCH, *ad ? A C 2 . XJWCSS (aaxs iaadtar a s l i « c l i v a l ? 
Ti iJ Memorsadsi l i c x a c n a d f a r ta« « » « * * ?ar?o*« 
o i daaer ia iag taa«* ^naa-sara «gra«d caca Sy ta« ? « r ^ « s hars-sa 
va ica s u r ^ v c t=« d s s l a ? ad ta* t raaaaca iaa . 
1- Zz L* s u a s a l l y a<yr**d ind ^sdezs-caod Z2*z xr^sr 
raearajrsiaa cd ; » • ?UD ?Lic tad ±a« 3«c laraa iaa ad Cav«a*at3, 
Canddaiaaj aad Xasariaaiaa*, *nd u s e s r a c s i s c oi «aci 
514Q,oaQ.aO i a p r i a e i a * ! (baa nor i a d a d i a g ?a* €«aaasa aoaey 
asd down payaaaa 3©a*y) , S*AI*r i h t l l «a»caa» i sd d«ll*r*x ta 
3Txy«r t P a r t i a l D+md ad ftacarayiacs f a r ea« (U ?T3 l a a . 
2 . Cpca ta*- payMa-c od t a * ra laaa* pr iaa , ^ay*r iha 11 
b* «ax±dl*d ta ta* r*laaa« od aa* CI) l e a od 3ny*rJ* caoia* saaa 
rmcaipa od ta* paytsaaa or t c any t i a * tacraadaar,. 
3 . 1* i a agr**d taaa* a t ta* ' t i s* c i •xacaaiaa ad 
t n i i Jfcraeraadaa, 3ay*r i a * paid ta S e l l e r t s« s i s ad SSI2,aaa.a<3 
vhica w i l l r e l e a s e i raa ta* 2«*d a i ? r a « tar«* (2] ?ra I C ^ J -
Cpca ta* racarda^isa af ta« ?TS ? l a a md 3*ciaraa±aa a£ C s v « a a a a , 
rirnrtf.aiaM and 3*a tr i ca i caa v i t a ^ * S u = i s Caaaay aacardar, 
3ay*r x a a l l be « a a i t l * d ta ta* r s l a a a * i r a a ta* 0«*d a i rraxa cd 
tar** (3) ?€3 l a t a ad 3uy«r4« caa ia* tr<?*aa*r vi^a ta* ta id ra*d-
v*y. 
0011 
4* 2a the ereat Buyer sacald pay ta Sel ler any princi-
pal rai i s mxcm»M or* tha agreed tpca release prica, said so» 
shal l be applied toward tha n e « r a l * « M pr ice , i . a . , should Bayer 
aaxa a principal paymeat of 5160,1300.00. tha sua of' 520,000.00 
(51£0;000.00 lass 5140,000.00) shall be applied toward the next 
release prica which shal l repairs sa additional principal payaeat 
Of 5120,000.00 (520,000.00 piss 5120,000.00 eqaaia 5140,000.00) 
ta release the aaxa l o t . 
5. The praaoeed plat i s attached hereta as Sxhihit 
•*• aad by this rafaraaca iacarpcratad herein. Sel ler heraay 
acknowledges aad acraes ta execata aa a liaaholdar tha original 
plat prior ta recardatioa. Oaacas in tha prapoaad plat aad tha 
Deciaratica of Coveaaats, Conditions aad Restrictions *n*n pre-
parad shall ha lahjeca ta tha reascnaale approval of Sel ler . 
6. Saliar &<??*** to grant ta Susosit Cnunty tha tan 
aad one-half (10-1/2) fact strip of land outlined in rad oa 
2xh±bit *\m. Said eanveyaaca shall ba tar tha sola ?vr?omm of 
vidaaiatj tha Cauaty roadway. If poss ihie , such grant shall ba 
ia tha fara of aa easeaeat. Tha Canary indicates that i t i s 
possiale that tha Csaaty raad aa i t e x i s t s i s not whers i t i s 
plattad. 2f sach 'pTS^mm ta ba a faca« Saliar aeraes that upon 
prapar Tacatica, qnit c la ia aad ahaadoasaat of tha plattad road 
by tha Couaty, Se l ler MHAII graat ta tha Caaaty fay way of 
aasaaaat i f possible) tha Caaaty road aa i t i x i u j aa i t i s 
shown oa Exhibit 9\m. 
7. Buyer agrees to provide Saliar wi •-*. one (1) *mst*r 
connection aad one (13 caiinary watar connection into Buyer's 
syatsms at luch tiaa aa eacn i s available, and Sailer shall pay 
a connection fee aad service fee equal ta the pro rata coat ta 
tha ptirsa**«r of * loa in Buyer's proposed 7TJD piua 41x7 chargaa 
o i ixaaaih Vafcar DiatrlSuxing Company* Eb* wv«r and vatar 
aaaaacaiaa graatad ahc*r« can b* naad by 3«Ilar in ae*r 
ceaatmctioa iJf allowed on tha S«3 acra parcal or for coaaac-
tiaa ta tha eais*iaq raaidaacsj or^Sailar, Should Sallar ra^uira 
another vatar and/or savar connection^ upon payment of 'the saoa 
charge sat forth in the prior santanca, i i va i l and savar Una 
c*4*aci*y la availaaia in Suyar'a syataax, and i i 3uy*r shall 
convey to Se l ler vhatavar vatar right* tna 3card of Health 
vauid raquir* isr en* (1] culinary connection (no* to «ca«a 
ona aera/foot} Mild tna location of tna rsaidancaa to be locatad 
oa tna retained apprcxiaataly 3,3 acra portion of Se l l er 4 ! 
property snail a* suajecu to tna raaaonaala approval of Leon H* 
Saunders and tna residences to be ccnatructad on tna MMld 3*5 
•era parcal shal l be subject to tna saxna raatricticna «a 3uvar's 
raaidancaa are subject to '>nidar the Covenants, Conditions and 
Xaatrictiona oi Whita ?ina Han eh FTO, 3uyer shall gran* to 
Seller another ona (1J culinary conn action and ona (13 itvar 
caaaecaica.. I i Se l ler doaa aou rec^ueaa tha sacond culinary 
wauar connection and/or %m*mx connection. Sai ler Is aot 
subject to tha condition* set forth in tha iaaadiataly 
praoadiac sentanca* Tha location through 3uy*r's property 
oi tha tmvmx l ina and culinary vatar Una shall ba desiguatad 
by 3uy«r sad 3uyer w i l l u x s such daaignaaioa to tha cioaaat 
raaacnahia connection point to S e l l e r ' s property, 
3, 3uyer and•Seller aqrs* tha* none of then nave en-
gaged a Seal I s t a t s 3rc**r, Agent or Finder for the purposes of 
affacting this transaction and no ccaaission, fee or other con-
pansation shall be due and cvioc to any such 3roxer, Agent or 
?iader MM a raault oi this cioainc. 
9. This Meacraadua and tha closing docuaenta exscatad 
aiaultaneoualy haravita contain a l l tha understandings, varrantiaa. 
• 3 -
rapraaaatatiooa aad i^rt«a«at2 aaon? tha partlaa 4nd taa 
a n aatarad la ta i f tar aaca parry tu* paracaally tad fully i a -
*wavt±gatad a l l facta aad eiraaaataacas caacaraiaa; taa traaaac-
tifiaa raflactad by tad eoatasrpUtad aaraia tad aoaa of taa 
paxtiaa asa ralyiao; \a?ca tay stataaaata or rapraaaatatiaaa aaa 
•mhadimd aaraia. 
10 • Tlsa ia of taa mssmncn of tala Maaorandca aad 
i t aay act b* oral ly caaagad. modified or tsraiaatad aaeapt-ia 
>§riala«, aioaad by taa parry aaaiaat vnca taa saaa ia acnaat ta 
ba aafaraad, Taa tarss of tala Haaaraadaa shall apply ta tad 
biad taa halra, a*acatara# ad=uaiatratara, sucssaaora tad 
assign* of taa raspactiva ?*rti«a harata. 
11- la t£a avast of braaca or default of tay oaiiga-
t ioa aadar tala Meaoraadusu taa defauifcia? ?*2rZY saal l pay All 
expeases of enforcing taa saaa or tay right arising out of breach 
*or da fau l t thereof, including- rasscaaale tttaraeys* fees , whether 
iacarrad with or without suit tad both before and aftar Jadcxaat. 
12- All warrantias, eaveaaats, obligation* and agree-
aanta csatalaad baxsla *hMll survive taa closing of tala trans-
action and aay aad a l l docnaeats aad laatranenta dalivarad ia 
caaaactioa herewith tad snail raavala aiadlag upon taa paxtiaa 
harata* 
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t . »I » 
Donald J. Winder, Esq. (#3513) 
Kathy A. ?. Davis, Esq. (#4022) 
Tamara K. Prince, Esq." (#5224) 
WINDER & HASLAM 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendants Sharps 
P 2 C 1553 
C:sr-- :.-= !T:Sl. Court Z 
wsp-_r/ Clanc 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LEON H. SAUNDERS; ROBERT 
FELTON; J. RICHARD REES; 
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT 
CORPORATION, a Utah corpora-
tion; WHITE PINE RANCHES, a 
Utah general oartnerhiD; 
WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES", a 
Utah general partnersnip, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN C. SHARP, and GERALDINE 
1
 Y. SHARP; ASSOCIATED TITLE 
COMPANY, as Trustee, a Utan 
corporation, 
Defendants. 




ROBERT FELTON, LEON H. 
SAUNDERS; J. RICHARD REES; 
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT 
CORPORATION, a Utah corpora-
tion; KENNETH R. NORTON dba 
^ L OVA no. a<63^ > 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C37-1S21 
Jucce J. Dennis Frederick 
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INTERSTATE RENTALS, INC., 
and RAUL H. LANDE3, indivi-
dually; WHITE PINE RANCHES, 
a Utah general oartnershio, 
and WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES, 
a Utah general partnership, 
Counterclaim-Defendants. 
This cause came on for trial before the Honorable I 
J. Dennis Frederick on January 23, 1983 through January 29, 
1988 and March 22, 1983 through March 25, 1938, with the de- | 
fendants John C. and Geraldine Y. Sharp (hereinafter the 
"Sharps") appearing by counsel Donald J. Winder, Kathy A. F. 
Davis and Tamara K. Prince, the latter being admitted oro hac 
vice, and plaintiffs White Pine Ranches, White Pine Enter-
prises, Leon H. Saunders (hereinafter "Saunders") , Robert 
Felton (hereinafter "Felton"), J. Richard Rees and Saunders 
Land Investment Corporation appearing by counsel Robert M. I 
Anderson, Glen D. Watkins and Mark R. Gay lord. Counterclaim I 
defendant Kenneth R. Norton ("Norton") acoeared through his I 
counsel John 3. Anderson, only to introduce a Stipulation and i 
Indemnification Agreement between plaintiffs and counterclaim 
defendant Norton. Defendant Associated Title was never served j 
in this action. Counterclaim defendant Paul K. Landes (here- I 
inafter "Landes") was never served in this action. 
Having heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, 
0017 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HERE3Y ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DE-
CREED that plaintiffs' Complaint be dismissed, no cause of 
action. 
IT IS' FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
Saunders, Felton, Interstate Rentals, Inc. and Norton are in-
debted, jointly and severally, to the Sharps in the following 
amounts: 
a. i. Principal: S 371,739.35 
ii. Interest through 
March 22, 1988: $ 171,033.54 
iii. Late payment charge: S 14,869.57 
TOTAL: $ 557,642.46 
together with interest thereon at the per diem rate of 
$133.32 from and after March 22, 1988. 
b. i. Trustee's fees: $ 1,803.80 
ii. Court Costs: S 2,381.04 
iii. Attorneys' fees through 
August 31, 1988: $ 144,088.75 
together with interest thereon at the rate of 10% per 
annum from the date of expenditure by the Sharps until 
paid by plaintiffs. 
c. Delinquent property taxes: $ 20,368.62 
together with interest and penalties assessed thereon as 
provided by law, property taxes accruing for 1988, and 




IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this 
Judgment shall be supplemented and augmented in the amount of 
the Sharps' reasonable attorney's fees as established by affi-
davit and as incurred after August 31, 1988 in preparation of 
the Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, in responding to any 
post-trial motions, in collecting said Judgment by execution 
or otherwise, and after prevailing in any appeal, 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Temporary Restraining Order entered in the above captioned 
matter by the Honorable Judith M. Billings on September 4, 
1986 was wrongfully issued and it is hereby lifted and dis-
solved. The Sharps are hereby awarded judgment against the 
bond posted by plaintiffs with the Summit County Clerk in Sep-
tember, 1986 in the amount of 32,400.00 and against the secur-
ity posted by Tracy Collins Bank with the Clerk of this Court 
in the amount of S23,570.63, and for which amounts the plain-
tiffs are not secured by the fair market value of the subject 
premises• 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECF^ED that Lot 6 as 
described in the final recorded plat of White Pine Rancnes 
Phase I and the unplatted property more particularly described 
on Exhibit "A" attached hereto or such portions thereof as may 
be sufficient to pay the amounts found to be due and owing 
under this Judgment, together with interest as set forth here-
inabove and accrued costs herein, and expenses of sale, be 
sold at puolic auction by the Sheriff of Summit County, State 
of Utah, in the manner prescribed by law for such sales; that 
-4- G01U73 
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said Sheriff, if and when the subject premises are sold by 
him, out of the proceeds of such sale shall retain first his 
costs, disbursements and commission, and then pay to the 
Sharps, or to their attorneys, the accrued and accruing costs 
of this action, then said sums for the Sharps' attorneys1 
fees, and the amount owing to the Sharps for principal, in-
terest, costs and expenses of sale and maintenance, taxes, 
assessments and/or insurance premiums, together with accrued 
interest thereon, or so much of said sums as said proceeds 
will pay, and that the surplus, if any, shall be accounted for 
and paid over to the Clerk of this Court subject to this 
Court's further order. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that all per-
sons having an interest in the subject premises shall have the 
right, upon producing satisfactory proof of interest, to re- I 
deem the same within the time provided by law for such redemp- [ 
tion; that from and after the expiration of the period of re-
demption as provided by law, tha~ the plaintiffs aoove named, j 
and each of them, and all persons claiming by, through or un-
der them, or any of them, shall be forever barred and fore-
closed of all right, title, interest and estate in and to the J 
subject premises, and that from and after the delivery of the i 
Sheriff's Deed to the subject premises than the grantees named j 
therein be given possession thereof. I 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that if a 
deficiency results after due and proper application of the 
- 5 - / -*<< r^r^ \ 
0020 
proceeds of such Sheriff's Sale, the Sharps are heresy awarded 
a personal judgment against Saunders, Felton, Norton and 
Interstate Rentals, Inc., and each of them, jointly and sev-
erally, for the full amount of such deficiency. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Sharps shall have the right, at their request, to one connec-
tion to both plaintiffs* culinary water and sewer systems on 
White Pine Ranches Phase I for a connection fee of $2,000 
each. 
IT 13 FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that a non-
exclusive appurtenant easement shall run with the land, as a 
covenant running with the land or as an equitable servitude, 
as the case may be, in favor of and for the use and benefit of 
the unplatted acreage described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto 
and incorporated herein by reference and the owners and pur-
chasers thereof (including the Sharps) and their invitees, 
guests, heirs and successors in interest, for utilities and 
for access to and the right to use as a means for ingress and 
egress for vehicular and pedestrian access over, under and 
across the private roadway (White Pine Lane) shown on the re-
corded final plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I, recorded with 
the Summit County Recorder; and a non-exclusive appurtenant 
easement to run with the land, as a covenant running with the 
land or as an equitable servitude, as the case may be, in 
favor of and for the use and benefit of White Pine Ranches 
-6-
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Phase I and the owners and purchasers thereof (including the 
Sharps) and their heirs and successors in interest for water 
lines, water tank and water systems over, under and across the 
subject premises near the southwest corner of the unplatted 
acreage as also shown on the final recorded plat of White Pine 
Ranches Phase I. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
final plat and Declaration of Protective Covenants recorded 
for White Pine Ranches Phase I with the Summit County Record-
er's Office and the non-exclusive easements set forth above 
shall remain in full force and effect, and not be affected by 
the foreclosure ordered herein, a purchase at the Sheriff1s 
Sale, or a subsequent redemption of the subject premises, 
other than a complete redemption thereof by the plaintiffs 
herein coupled with plaintiffs1 declaration for the ex-
tinguishment of the non-exclusive easement in favor of the 
unplatted acreaoe. 
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Beginning a t a point South *33 degrees 43*35* West along tha 
Ncrth l i n e c i Let 3, 172*42 i a e t izrsa t i e corner oi Lct^ s 1 
and 3, a brass cap sa t by tha U.S* Canarai Land Oii ica, sa id 
brass cap also being South 00 degrees 13 US* West along 
s e c t i o n l i n e 1236.H faet i r e s t i e Northeast-comer oi 
S e c t i o n 1, Tcvnship 2 South, Range 3 Zast , Salt Laia 3asa 
and Meridian; and running thanca South 33 dagraas 43*36" 
West aXcng t i e North l i n e o£ Lot 7 and 3 2343.33 faet to tha 
Northwest corner oi Lot 7; thenca South 00 dagraes 12*25" 
l a s t along t i e West l i n e oi Lot 7, 1312.34 faat to t i e • 
S c u t h v a s t - c o m e r oi Lot 7; thence North 39 dagraes 47 f41rf 
l a s t along the Scutb l ine oi Lot 7, 322.57 faec; tianca 
North 61 decrees 00 '00" l a s t 1355.90 fae t ; thenca North 47 
degrees I S ' l i " Zasc 462.72 i a e t ; thanca North. 4 2 decraas 
44 t 40 l f l a s t 3e.53 iaac to the peine ci beginning. 
LZS3 and excepting Whits Pins 32nchss, 5h2se Z, a Planzsd Basicsntial 
Eeveicpxe*rc, *<" •--"^^ to the off icial plat trsrscf en file and cf 
rscord in the Suznit Couafcv Heccrdar's Offica, Stscs of Utah. 
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Tab 4 
Donald J. Winder (#3519) 
Kathy A. F. Davis (#4022) 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000 
Post Office Box 2668 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84110-2668 
Telephone: ' (301) 322-2222 
Attorneys for Defendants Sharp 
MAY 1 ** ""• 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LEON H. SAUNDERS, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
-v-
JOHN C. SHARP, et al., 
Defendants-
JOHN C. SHARP, et al. 
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs, 
-v-
RC3ERT FELTON, et al-, 
Counterclaim-Defendants. 
AMENDED 
ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' 
SECOND MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT 
JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO 
INCREASE LIABILITY ON BOND 
Civil No. C37-1521 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Defendants' Second Motion to Supplement Judgment and 
Motion to Increase Liability on 3ond came on regularly for 
hearing before the Honorable J, Dennis Frederick on Monday, 
the 12th day of February, 1990 at the hour of 10:30 a.m. The 
Sharps were represented by their counsel Donald J. Winder and 
Kathy A. F. Davis. Plaintiffs were represented by their 
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counsel Robert M. Anderson and Mark Gaylord. The Court, hav-
ing reviewed the pleadings and memoranda on file herein, hav-
ing heard the arguments of counsel, having received the prof-
fers of counsel for the Sharps, and good cause appearing 
therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Taxes on Lot 1 as described in the final recorded 
plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I in the principal amount of 
$2,271.48 plus penalties and interest thereon be paid on or 
before March 15, 1990. If the plaintiffs fail to pay the 
taxes due and owing on Lot 1 by March 15, 1990, the Order 
Staying Proceedings dated January 31, 1989 shall be automati-
cally vacated and defendants shall be allowed to proceed to 
execute on the Judgment and this Order entered herein. Subse-
quent to the Court's ruling, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Pay-
ment or Property Taxes Pursuant to the Court's Order dated 
February 22, 1990. 
2. The Judgment entered in this matter on September 26, 
1988 is hereby supplemented through February 12, 1990 by the 
amount of 3231,536.97 for a total Judgment of $938,053.02 as 
of February 12, 1990. The supplementation includes the fol-
lowing amounts: 
a. Attorney's fees reasonably and necessarily in-
curred by the Sharps from September 1, 1988 through October 
31, 1989 in the amount of $79,967.34, which amount excludes 
the following categories set forth in the Summary of Plain-
tiffs' Objections to Attorney's Fees presented as Defendants' 
-2-
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Exhibit 2 at the hearing (the "Summary"): "Settlement" in the 
amount of $473.38; "Attorney's fees" in the amount of $84,00? 
"Tracy Collins Appeal" in the amount of $24,381.51 (for a 
total of $24,938.89); 
b. The pre-judgment interest accrued on the Judgment 
from the date it accrued on the principal or the date the at-
torney's fees, court costs or trustee's fees were paid through 
September 26, 1988 as follows: 
(1) Principal from 3/22/88 
to 9/26/88: $34,464.16 
(2) Attorney's fees: $ 5,800.77 
(3) Court costs: $ 249.63 
(4) Trustee's fees: $ 230.93 
TOTAL: $40,745.49 
c. The post-judgment interest, excluding interest on 
payments made after October 31, 1989, accruing on the Judgment 
from the date thereof (September 26, 1988) through February 12, 
1990 as follows: 
(1) Principal 
($183.32 x 504 davs 
9/26/88 - 2/12/901: $ 92,393.28 
(2) Attorney's fees: 
Paid Prior to Judgment 
(i) (Second Affidavit of 
Albert D. Nystrom 
9/27/88 - 10/31/89): $11,287,91 
(ii) ($28.20 x 104 days 
10/31/88 - 2/12/90): $ 2,932.80 
Paid Post-Judgment 
(9/26/88 - 2/12/90) 
(i) (Third Affidavit of 
Albert D. Nystrom 
$5,446.29 - $1,781.26, 
(interest backed out, 
2/13/90 - 8/1/90, 
169 days x $10.54): $ 3,665.03 $ 17,885.74 
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(3) Court costs 
($.79 x 504 days 
9/26/88 - 2/12/90): $ 398.16 
(4) Trustee's fees: 
($.49 x 504 days 
9/26/88 - 2/12/90) $ 246.96 
TOTAL: $110,924.14 
3. The Order Re: Supersedeas Bond entered on March 17, 
1989 is hereby supplemented through August 1, 1990 in the fol-
lowing amounts: 
a. Attorney's fees reasonably and necessarily in-
curred by the Sharps from September 1, 1988 through October 
31, 1989 in the amount of $79,967.34, which amount excludes 
the following categories set forth in the Summary of Plain-
tiffs' Objections to Attorney's Fees presented as Defendants' 
Exhibit 2 at the hearing (the "Summary"): "Settlement" in the 
amount of $473.38; "Attorney's fees" in the amount of $34.00; 
"Tracy Collins Appeal" in the amount of $24,381.51 (for a 
total of $24,938.89); 
b. The pre-judgment interest accrued on the Judgment 
from the date it accrued on the principal or the date the at-
torney's fees, court costs or trustee's fees were paid through 
September 26, 1988 as follows: 
(1) Principal from 3/22/88 
to 9/26/88: 334,464.J 6 
(2) Attorney's fees: S 5,300.77 
(3) Court costs: S 249.63 
(4) Trustee's fees: S 230.93 
TOTAL: 340,745.49 
c. The post-judgment interest, excluding interest on 
payments made after October 31, 1989, accruing on the Judgment 
-4-
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from the date thereof (September 26, 1988) through August 1, 
1990 as follows: 
(1) Principal ($183.32 x 
674 days): $123,557.68 
(2) Attorney's fees: 
Paid Prior to Judgment 
(Second Affidavit of 
Albert D. Nystrom) $11,237.91 
($28.20 x 274 days) $ 7,726.80 
Paid Post-Judgment 
(Third Affidavit of 
Albert D. Nystrom) $ 5,446.29 $ 24,461.00 
(3) Court costs ($.79 x 
674 days): $ 532.46 
(4) Trusteefs fees ($.49 x 
674 days): $ 330.26 
TOTAL: $148,881.40 
d. The Order Re: Supersedeas Bond is supplemented in 
the amount of $136,800.99, through August 1, 1990 ($976,009.98) 
less the security thereon ($839,208.99). The Order Re: Super-
sedeas Bond awarding a supersedeas bond in the amount of 
$79,793.36 (which was the anticipated interest accruing for 
one year post-judgment), together with the Tracy Collins bond 
in the amount of $28,570.63, the cash bond of $2,400 and Lot 6 
and the unplatted property valued at $728,445.00 previously 
secured the Judgment in the amount of $839,208.99. See 
attached Exhibit "A," the Calculation of Supersedeas Bond. 
4. The attorney's fees requested with regard to the 
"Settlement," in the amount of S473.78, and "Tracy Collins 
Appeal," in the amount of $24,381.51, as set forth on the Sum-
mary are taken under advisement. 
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5. Plaintiffs are ordered to post additional security as 
a supersedeas bond for the continued stay of the execution of 
the Judgment pursuant to the Order Re: Supersedeas Bond dated 
March 17, '1989 in the amount of $136,800.99 on or before 
March 15, 1990- If Plaintiffs fail to do so by March 15, 
1990, the Order Staying Proceedings dated January 31, 1989 
shall be automatically vacated and the Sharps shall be allowed 
to proceed to execute on the Judgment entered in the above 
captioned matter. 
DATED this In day of /Jlf^l , 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
id. 
'J.' DENNIS FREDERICK, Judge 
0029 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused true and correct copies of 
the foregoing proposed AMENDED ORDER RE: DEFENDANT'S SECOND 
MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO INCREASE LIABILITY 
ON BOND to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, on this Q Q, 
day of April, 1990, to the following: 
Stanford B. Owen, Esq. 
Patrick L. Anderson, Esq. 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
215 South State Street, 12th Floor 
Post Office Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Robert M. Anderson, Esq. 
Glen D. Watkins, Esq. 
ANDERSON & WATKINS 
700 Valley Tower Building 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1018 
John B. Anderson, Esq. 
ANDERSON & HOLLAND 
Post Office Box 11643 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
David L. Gladwell 
Chapter 7 Trustee 
Post Office Box 3205 




CALCULATION OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND 
Trust Deed Note 
(a) Principal $371,739.35 
(b) Interest - March 22, 1988 171,033.54 
(C) Interest ~ March 22, 1988 through 
September 26, 1988 ($183.32 x 188 days) 34,464.16 
(d) Late Payment Penalty 14,869.57 
SUBTOTAL: $592,106.62 
(e) Post-Judgment Interest — 
September 26, 1988 through 
August 1, 1990 ($183.32 x 674 days) 123,557.68 
SUBTOTAL: $715,664.30 
Costs 
(a) Trustees Fees $ 1,803.80 
(b) Court Costs 2,881.04 
(c) Attorney's Fees 
(i) Awarded in Judgment 144,088.75 
(ii) Third Affidavit plus fees 
requested in Motion less fees in 
amount of $24,938.89 under advisement 79,967.34 
SUBTOTAL: $228,740.93 
interest 
(a) Legal Fees paid to August 1, 1990 
(S24,461.00 plus pre-judgment 
interest of S5,800.77) $ 30,261.77 
(b) Trustees Fees to August 1, 1990 
($.49 x 674 days plus pre-judgment 
interest of S230.63) 560.39 
(c) Court costs to August 1, 1990 
($.79 x 674 days plus pre-judgment 
interest of $249.63) 782.09 
SUBTOTAL: $ 31,604.75 
TOTAL: $976.009.98 
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CALCULATION OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND 
(Page 2) 
S e c u r i t y 
(a) Lot 6 and Unplatted Property $728,445.00 
(b) Temporary Restraining Order Bonds 
(i)* Cash Bond 2,400.00 
(ii) Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Co. Bond 28,570.63 
(c) Supersedeas Bond 79,793.36 
TOTAL: (With Tracy Collins Bond) $839,208.99 
Additional Security Necessary 
(a) As of August 1, 1990 $976,009.98 
(b) LESS; Present Security 839,208.99 
ADDITIONAL SECURITY NEEDED: 




Donald J. Winder (#3519) 
Kathy A. F. Davis (#4022) 
Tamara K. Prince (#5224) 
WINDER & HASLAM 
Suite 4004 
175 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 322-2222 
Attorneys for Defendants Sharp 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LEON H. SAUNDERS, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN C. SHARP, et al. , 
Defendants. 
JOHN C. SHARP, et al. , 
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROBERT FELTON, e t a l . , 
Counterc la im-Defendants . 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
ALBERT D. NYSTROM 
C i v i l No. C87-1621 
Judge J . Dennis Frederick 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Albert D. Nystrom, after being first duly sworn, de 
pose and say that: 
1. I am a licensed and certified public accountant i 
the State of Utah. 
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! 2. Based upon the Judgment entered by this Court in the 
| above case, I have calculated interest on the principal from 
M March 22, 1988 to the date of the Judgment, September 26, 
! 1988. Such interest totals $34,464.16. Interest continues to 
II 
accrue at a per diem rate of S183.32. 
3. Based upon the payments made by the Sharps pursuant 
to the Winder & Haslam monthly billings for legal services 
attached to the affidavits filed with the Court, I have calcu-
lated interest on such legal fees at the Judgment rate of 10% 
since the date of each payment. Such interest totals 
S5,800.77 from date of expenditure to the date of Judgment:. 
Interest continues to accrue at a per diem rate of S28.20 on 
such legal fees. See Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 
4. Z have also calculated interest on such legal fees 
of 522,400.00 which were paid after the date of Judgment, 
Septemoer 26, 1988, to November 7, 1938. From date of expen-
diture to September 26, 1990, the end of a two-year appeal 
period, sucn interest totals S4,240.63. Interest continues to 
accrue after November 7, 1988 at a per diem rate of S6.14. 
See Exhibit "3M attached hereto. 
5. Based upon the payments made by the Sharps for 
Trustee's fees (see the Affidavit of John C. Sharp), I have 
calculated interest on such Trustee's fees at the Judgment 
rate of 10% per annum since the date of each payment. Sucn 
interest totals S230.93 from date of expenditure to the date 
-2-
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of the Judgment. Interest continues to accrue at a per diem 
rate of $.49. See Exhibit "C" attached hereto. 
6. Based upon payments made by the Sharps for Court 
costs (see the Affidavit of John C. Sharp and the affidavits 
of attorney's fees filed with the Court), I have calculated 
interest on such Court costs at the Judgment rate of 10% per 
annum since payment. Such interest totals S249.63 from date 
of expenditure to the date of the Judgment. Interest con-
tinues to accrue at a per diem rate of $.79. See Exhibit "D" 
attached hereto. 
7. I have calculated the interest on the full Judgment 
at the applicable rate provided in the Judgment, for an esti-
mated two-year appeal period, from September 26, 1988 to Sep-
temoer 26, 1990. Such interest totals 5159,586.71. There-
after, interest continues to accrue at a per diem rate of 
S218.94. See Exhibit "E" attached hereto. 
8. Based upon the current rate for a six-month Treasury 
Bill of 8.33%, I discounted the fair market value of the Prop-
erty as found by the Court of S728,445.00 to its present value 
assuming a one and one-half month foreclosure holding period 
and a six-month selling period. After the one and one-half 
month foreclosure period, the present value of the Property 
would be 5720,938.23 or $7,506.77 of lost value. The present 
value after a six-month selling period would be $699,318.39 or 
S29,126.61 of lost value. See Exhibit "F" attached hereto. 
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r<& DATED this *—*/ ""day of 1988, 
<£ 
Albert D. Nystrom 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me t h i s c£?-fA day of 
D w w W r , 1988. 
- « • / 
Zzzlrv* Ap.\2 2*. 1Cfc?2 i i 
VKKY L. KSA'.Y I) 
173 Aes: 203 SS.BI / | 
dtssqigm -Expires: i t
  
NOTARY PUBLIC sr 







& GERALDINE SHARP 
CALCULATION OF INTEREST DOE ON LEGAL FEES 
PAID TO WINDER & HASLAM (For period from 

























































































































































& GERALDINS SHARP 
CALCULATION OF INTEREST DOS ON LEGAL FEES 
PAID TO WINDER & HASLAM AFTER JUDGMENT DATS 
(For period from date oaid to September 26, 1990, 
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Calculation includes attorney's fees paid by John and 
Geraldine Sharp through 11/07/88 only. 
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EXHIBIT C 
JOHN C AND GERALDINE SHARP 
CALCULATION OF INTEREST DUE ON TRUSTEE'S FEES 




stand- Amount Per 
Date Interest ing to of diem 























































TOTALS S I . 8 0 3 . 8 0 
10% 612 S33.53 S .05 
10% 583 S31.95 S .05 
10% 522 S28.60 S .05 
10% 492 S26.96 S .05 
10% 462 S25.32 S .05 
10% 431 S23.62 S .05 
10% 399 S21.36 S .05 
10% 369 S20.22 S .05 
10% 338 S18.87 S .06 
(Rounding a d j u s t m e n t ) S .03 








































1 OF INTERE2 ;T DUE 





























































JOHN C. AND GERALDINE SHARP 
CALCULATION OF INTEREST DUE FOR A TWO-YEAR 
APPEAL PERIOD, SEPTEMBER 26, 1988 to 
SEPTEMBER 26, 1990 ON THE REMAINING PRINCIPAL BALANCE 
OF THE PARK CITY LAND SALE CONTRACT, 
ATTORNEY FEES PAID BY JOHN & GERALDINE SHARP*, 
COURT COSTS AND TRUSTEE'S FEES 
Amount of 
Interest for 
Interest the Two-Year 
DescriDtion Balance Rate ADDeal Period Per Diem 
Remaining balance $371,739.35 18% S133,826.16 $183.32 
of the Park City 
land sale contract 
Attorney's fees 
paid by John C & 
Geraldine Sharp 
As of 9/26/88: $102,914.67 10% S 20,582.94 $ 28.20 
From 9/26/88 
to 11/07/88: $ 22,400.00 10% S 4,240.65 $ 6.14 
Court costs S 2,881.04 10% S 576.20 $ .79 
Trustee's fees $ 1,803.80 10% S 360.76 $ .49 
Total Interest for a two-year appeal period: 
S159.586.71 
Total Per Diem Rate as of 11/7/88: S218.94 
* Calculation includes attorney's fees paid by John and 
Geraldine Sharp through 11/7/88 only. 
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EXHIBIT F 
JOHN C. AND GERALDINE SHARP 
CALCULATION OF PRESENT VALUE OF S728,445.00 
FOR A ONE AND ONE-HALF MONTH AND SIX MONTH PERIOD 
AT THE INTEREST RATE OF 8.3 3% 
Present Value 
One and One-Half Month Period 
Question: 
What amount ( t h e " P r e s e n t Value Amount") i n v e s t e d a t 8.33% 
would e q u a l S 7 2 8 . 4 4 5 . 0 0 45 days from t o d a y ? 
S o l u t i o n : 
I n t e r e s t R a t e f o r 45 Day P e r i o d : 
( 4 5 / 3 6 0 ) ( . 0833) = .0104125 
The P r e s e n t Va lue Amount: 
S 7 2 3 , 4 4 5 . 0 0 
1 .0104125 = 5 7 2 0 , 9 3 8 . 2 3 
P r o o f : 
I n t e r e s t f o r 45 Days: 
( S 7 2 0 , 9 3 3 . 2 3 ) ( .0833) (45 /360) = $ 7 , 5 0 6 . 7 7 
Add! the Present Value Amount: 3720,933.23 
TOTAL: 728.445.00 
Present Value 
Six Month Period 
Question: 
What amount (the "Present Value Amount") invested at 8.33% 
would equal 5728,445.00 six months from today? 
Solution: 
Interest Rate for Six Month Period: 
(6/12) (.0833) = .04165 
0042 
The Present Value Amount: 
$ 7 2 8 , 4 4 5 . 0 0 
1 .04165 = 5 6 9 9 . 3 1 8 . 3 9 
P r o o f ; 
Interest for six Montns: 
(5699,318.39) (.0833) (6/12) = S 29,126.61 
Add Present Value Amount: S699.318.39 
TOTAL: $728.445.00 
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Donald J. Winder (#3519) 
Kathy A. F. Davis (#4022) 
Tamara K. Prince (#5224) 
WINDER & HASLAM 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000 
Post Office Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
Telephone: (801) 322-2222 
Attorneys for Defendants Sharp 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LEON H. SAUNDERS, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN C. SHARP, et al., 
Defendants. 
JOHN C. SHARP, et al., 
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROBERT FELTON, et al., 
Counterclaim-Defendants. 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF 
ALBERT D. NYSTROM 
Civil No. C37-1621 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Albert D. Nystrom, after being first duly sworn, de-
pose and say that: 
1. I am a licensed and certified public accounrant in 
the State of Utah. 
2. Based upon the Judgment entered by this Court: in the i 
above case, I have calculated interest on the principal from j 
j i 
March 23, 1988 to October 31, 1989. Such interest totals I 
I $107,792.16. Interest accrued at a per diem rate of $183.32. | 
! See Exhibit "A" attached hereto. , 
i 
3. I have also calculated interest on the principal 
II from September 26, 1988, the date Judgment was entered by this 
M ! 
Jj Court, to October 31, 1989. Such interest totals $73,328.00. « 
i Interest continues to accrue at a per diem rate of $183.32. 
i| 
,j See also Exhibit "A" attached hereto. j 
'i 
!« 4. Based upon the payments prior to the date of Judg-
|l ! 
| J ment, September 26, 1988, made by the Sharps pursuant to the 
! ! 
j Winder & Haslam monthly billings for legal services attached ! 
J to the affidavits filed with the Court, I have calculated in- ; 
I terest on such legal fees at the Judgment rate of 10% since I 
N . ! 
u the date of each payment. Such interest totals $17,088.68 , 
i t 
< i 
! from date of expenditure to October 31, 1989. From Septem-
ber 27, 1988 to October 31, 1989, such interest totals 
I $11,287.91. Interest continues to accrue at a per diem rate 
of $28.20 on such legal fees. See Exhibit "B" attached here-
to. Compare Affidavit of Albert D. Nystrom dated December 19, 
1988 ("First Affidavit"), paragraph 3. 
5. I have also calculated interest on such legal fees , 
i 
of $63,403.50 which were paid after the date of Judgment, Sep-
I j i 
i tember 26, 1988 to October 31, 1989 at the Judgment rate of i 
I j 









• to October 31, 1989, such interest totals $3,619.73. Interest 
J continues to accrue after October 31, 1989 at a per diem race 
of $17.37. See Exhibit "C" attached hereto. 
j 6. Based upon the payments made by the Sharps for 
i! 
I Trustee's fees (see the Affidavit of John C. Sharp), I have 
\ i 
lj calculated interest on such Trustee's fees at the Judgment: 
i1 rate of 10% per annum since the date of each payment to Octo-
.I 
jl ber 31, 1989. Such interest totals $428.60 from date of ex-
i • 
t 
, penditure to October 31, 1989. From September 27, 1988 to 
li 
;, October 31, 1989, such interest totals $197.67. Interest ccn-
i \ 
, tinues to accrue at a per diem rate of $,49. See Exhibit '"D" 
(( attached hereto. Compare First Affidavit, paragraph 5. 
I 1 . Based upon payments made by the Sharps for Court 
jj costs (see the Affidavit of John C. Sharp and the affidavits 
j| of attorney's fees filed with the Court), I have calculated 
\ interest on such Court costs at the Judgment rate of 10% per 
annum since the date of each payment to October 31, 1989. 
Such interest totals $565.63 from date of expenditure to Octo-
ber 31, 1989. From September 27, 1988 to October 31, 1989, 
such interest totals $316.00. Interest continues to accrue at 
a per diem rate of $.79. See Exhibit "E" attached here:o. 
Compare First Affidavit, paragraph 6. 
8. I have attached a summarization of the interest and 
late payment charges on the full Judgment (excluding amounts 
paid by Plaintiffs for property taxes owed on the property at 
issue) at the applicable rates provided in the Judgment for 
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the period ended October 31, 1989 of $315,397.91 with interest 
j for the period September 27, 1988 to October 31, 1989 total-
j! ling $88,749.31. For the period November 1, 1989 to Sep-
i i | tember 26, 1990, assuming a further one year appeal period, 
! 
| interest would total $75,956.10 for a combined total at Sep-
: tember 26, 1990 of $391,354.01. See Exhibits "F" and "G" at-
tached hereto and First Affidavit, , 
* — day of /$je~c<*M*4>*lJ DATED this 1989. 
^&*-t~l)~ 
Albert D. Nystrom 
A SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 8^) day of 
LkdtjJ^x , 1989. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Salt Lake City, 
Utah 




JOHN C. AND GERALDINE SHARP 
CALCULATION OF INTEREST DUE ON PRINCIPAL 










Per diem Amount 
interest of 
amount interest 
$ 183.32 5107,792.16 
JOHN C. AND GERALDINE SHARP 
CALCULATION OF INTEREST DUE ON PRINCIPAL 
For the Period September 27, 1988 to October 31, 1989 
Principal 
Number Per diem Amount 
Interest of interest of 
rate days amount interest 
$371,739.35 13% 400 $ 183.32 $73,328.00 
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EXHIBIT B 
JOHN C. & GERALD INE SHARP 





















LEGAL FEES PAID TO WINDER & HASLAM 








































































































Affidavit of Albert D. Nystrom dated December 19, 1988. 
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EXHIBIT C 
JOHN C. & GERALDINE SHARP 




















LEGAL FEES PAID TO WINDER S HASLAM 
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AND GERALDINE SHARP 
CALCULATION OF INTEREST DUE ON COURT COSTS 




































































TOTALS $2,881.04 $565.63 
Date Paid - 9/26/88 <$249.63>* 
TOTAL 9/27/88 - 10/31/89 $316.00 
.79 
Affidavit of Albert D. Nystrom dated December 19, 1988. 
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EXHIBIT F 
JOHN C. AND GERALDINE SHARP 
SUMMARIZATION OF INTEREST DUE ON PRINCIPAL TO OCTOBER 31, 1989 
AND INTEREST DUE ON LEGAL FEES, TRUSTEE'S FEES, AND COURT 
COSTS TO OCTOBER 31, 1989, AND THE INTEREST DUE ON THE 
PRINCIPAL, LEGAL FEES, TRUSTEE'S FEES, AND COURT COSTS FOR 
THE PERIOD NOVEMBER 1, 1989 TO SEPTEMBER 26, 1990 
(Assuming a Two Year Appeal Period) 
Interest and 
Total Interest late payment Per Diem 
Description Amount Rate charges amount 
Remaining balance $371,739*35 18% $183*32 
of the Park City 
land sale contract 
Interest through $171,033*54 
March 22, 1988 per 
the Judgment 
Late payment charges $ 14,869*57 
per the Judgment 
Interest for the $107,792,16 
March 23, 1988 to 
October 31, 1989 
Total $293,695*27 
Legal fees paid $102,914*67 10% $ 17,088.68 28*20 
prior to the 
Judgment: dare of 
September 26, 1988 
Legal fees paid $ 63,403.50 10% $ 3,619.73 17.37 
afrer the 
Judgment date to 





1 , 8 0 3 . 8 0 





4 2 8 . 6 0 
5 6 5 . 6 3 
$ 
$ 
. 4 9 
. 7 9 
Total as of October 31, 1989 3315,397.91 $230.17 
Add interest for the period 
November 1, 1989 to September 26, 1990, 
assuming a two year appeal period: 
330 days at the per diem 
rare of 210.17 $ 75,956.10 
Total as of September 26, 1990 S391.354.01 
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EXHIBIT G 
JOHN C. AND GERALDINE SHARP 
SUMMARIZATION OF INTEREST DUE ON PRINCIPAL 
SEPTEMBER 27, 1988 TO OCTOBER 31, 1989 AND 
INTEREST DUE ON LEGAL FEES, TRUSTEE'S FEES, AND COURT COSTS 
SEPTEMBER 27, 1988 TO OCTOBER 31, 1989 
Total Interest Per Diem 
Description Amount Rate Interest amount 
Principal 9/27/88 $371,739.35 18% $ 73,328.00 $183.32 
to October 31, 1989 
Legal fees paid $102,914.67 10% $ 11,287.91 28.20 
prior to the 
Judgment date of 
September 26, 1988 
Legal fees paid $ 63,403.50 10% $ 3,619.73 17.37 
after the 
Judgment date to 

















Donald J. Winder (#3519) 
Kathy A. F. Davis (#4022) 
Tamara K. Prince (#5224) 
WINDER & HASLAM 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000 
Post Office Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
Telephone: (801) 322-2222 
Attornevs for Defendants Sharo 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LEON H. SAUNDERS, et al., : 
Plaintiffs, : THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF 
: ALBERT D. NYSTROM 
vs. : 
JOHN C. SHARP, et al., : 
Defendants. : 
: Civil No. C37-1621 
JOHN C. SHARP, et al. , : 
: Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs, : 
vs. : 
jiROBERT FELTON, e t a l . , : 
!| Counterc la im-Defendants . : 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Albert D. Nvstrom, after being first duly sworn, de-
pose and say that: 
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1. I am a licensed and certified public accountant in 
the State of Utah. 
2. I have allocated the legal fees paid after the date 
of the Judgment, September 26, 1988, first to the amounts dis-
allowed or taken under advisement by the Court (in the total 
amount of $24,938.39) and then to those amounts allowed by the , 
Court. Compare, Second Affidavit of Albert D. Nystrom ("Sec- I 
ond Affidavit"), paragraph 5. 
3. Based upon the Judgment entered by this Court in the 
above case and the above allocation, I have recalculated in-
terest on the legal fees of $38,464.61 which were paid after 
the date of Judgment, September 26, 1988, through August 1, 
1990 at the Judgment rate of 1Q% since the date of each pay-
ment. From date of expenditure to August 1, 1990, such inter-
est totals $5,446.29. Interest continues to accrue after 
August 1, 1990 at a per diem rate of $10.54. Compare, Second 
Affidavit, paragraph 5. 
-2-
56 
DATED t h i s 7th day of March , 1990, 
J£Lbert D. Nystrom "~ " 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me t h i s ItL day of _ 
^y/\a^L , 1990. 




if Sapif»a Aprtl 23.1992 
i« 1 - V'CSY >_ HSAi,Y
 M 
Notary Public Residingrin 
Sa l t Lake City, Utah 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Leon H. Saunders, Robert Felton, 
Felton, Saunders Land Investment 
Corporation, a Utah corporation; 
White Pine Ranches, a Utah general 
partnership; and White Pine 
Enterprises, a Utah general 
partnership, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
John C. Sharp and Geraldine Y, 
Sharp, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
and 
Commissioner of Financial 
Institutions, Receiver for 
Tracy Collins Bank and Trust 
Company, 
Surety and Appellant. 
JULi2i390 
C x x Of •*• Court 
ORDER 
Case No- 880710-CA 
Case No. 880711-CA 
Before Judges Greenwood, Bench, and Davidson (on Law and Motion). 
This court having issued its remittitur and lacking 
jurisdiction to further consider the appeal, appellants' Motion for 
Stay of Remittitur Pending Review and For Approval of Supersedeas 
Bond is hereby DENIED. 
DATED this // day of July, 1990. 
FOR THE COURT: 
y^< y ^ r^y p 
7^t2<*^yy. s _^>y>^c<^<^^ I 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge ' 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
VJHITE PINE RANCHES 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
SHARP, JOHN C. 
DEFENDANT 





CASE NUMBER 870901621 CV 
DATE 08/01/90 
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK JAB 
AFTER REVIEW OF THE PLEADINGS AND UPON RECEIPT OF THE 
NOTICE TO SUBMIT MOTION FOR DECISION DATED JUY 30, 1990 THE 
COURT RULES AS FOLLOWS: 
1. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN C. BROWN 
IS GRANTED. 
2. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR STAY OF REMITTITUR AND JUDGMENT 
PENDINGS REVIEW AND FOR APPROVAL OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND IS DENIED 
FOR THE REASONS SET FORTH IN DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION THERETO. 
3. PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST FOR HEARING IS DENIED AS UNTIMELY 
PER RULE 4-501(3)(F) C.J.A. 
4. COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS IS TO PREPARE THE ORDER. 
0059 
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
LEON H. SAUNDERS; ROBERT FELTON; 
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT CORP., 
a Utah corporation; WHITE PINE 
RANCHES, a Utah general 
partnership; WHITE PINE 
ENTERPRISES, a Utah general 
partnership; and KENNETH R. NORTON, 
dba Interstate Rentals, Inc., a 
Nevada corporation, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
JOHN C. SHARP and GERALD INE Y. 
SHARP, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Petition No. 900360 
MOTION FOR STAY PENDING ACTION ON PETITION 
FOR CERTIORARI AND SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM 
Donald J. Winder, Esq. 
Kathv A.F. Davis, Esq. 
WINDER & HASLAM 
175 West 200 South, #4000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Attorneys for John C. and 
Geraldine Y. Sharp 
Robert M. Anderson, Esq. (0108) 
Glen D. Watkins, Esq. (3397) 
Bruce Wycoff, Esq. (4448) 
ANDERSON & WATKINS 
700 Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2018 
Telephone: (801) 532-1700 
Attorneys for Appellants Leon H. 
Saunders; Robert Felton; Saunders 
Land Investment; White Pine Ranches 
and White Pine Enterprises 
John B. Anderson, Esq. 
ANDERSON & HOLLAND 
623 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 363-9345 
Attorneys for Appellant Kenneth R. 
Norton dba Interstate Rentalsf Inc. 
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Pursuant to Rules 8(a) and 36(b), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Appellants, Leon H. Saunders, Robert Felton, Saunders 
Land Investment, White Pine Ranches, White Pine Enterprises and 
Kenneth R. Norton (collectively "White Pine") respectfully move 
this Court for a stay pending action by this Court on White Pine's 
Petition for Certiorari. As shown below, White Pine has first 
requested this stay and a hearing on a supersedeas bond from both 
the Court of Appeals and the trial court. Both of those courts 
have denied that request. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A* Facts Giving Rise to the Controversy. Basically, this Appeal 
involves the respective rights of the parties to approximately 38 
acres of land in Summit County, Utah. The factual background of 
this case is generally set forth in the recent Opinion of the Court 
of'Appeals reported at 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 68 (May 25, 1990) (A copy 
of that Opinion is attached hereto as Exhibit T ) . As a result 
of a bench trial, defendants received a judgment entitling them to 
foreclose and sell certain portions of real property developed in 
Summit County by White Pine, consisting of Lot 6 of the White Pine 
Ranches Subdivision and approxiiriately 27 acres of unplatted but 




In connection with their Complaint, White Pine requested a 
temporary restraining order enjoining a trustee's sale of the 
Property as well as the internal roadway serving the White Pine 
Subdivision. The trial court conditioned the issuance of that 
restraining order upon the posting of a cash bond in the amount of 
$2,400.00. Thereafter, upon the parties' stipulation to an 
injunction pending trial, the trial court imposed a $50,000.00 
injunction bond, which remained in place until the trial was 
concluded. 
B. Outcome of the Trial. A bench trial occurred on January 28-29 
and March 22-25, 1988. The trial court generally found in favor 
of Defendants/Respondents (the "Sharps"). Once all relevant post-
trial motions had been disposed of, White Pine filed its appeal, 
which was decided in the Sharps' favor in the Court of Appeals on 
May 25, 1990. 
C« The Initial Supersedeas Bond. The September 26, 1988 Judgment 
calculated White Pine's liability to the Sharps to total 
$759,415.63, inclusive of accrued interest, attorneys' fees, costs 
and taxes. The Court ruled the fair market value of the real 
property foreclosed was $728,445.00. Accordingly, the Judgment 
awarded the Sharps $30,970.63 against the bond already posted. 
On December 16, 1988 White Pine moved the trial court for a 
stay of the judgment pending appeal and for approval of supersedeas 
3 
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bond in the amount of $65,158•77, which included the shortfall 
calculated in the 'judgment, along with interest through June 30, 
1989. The Sharps opposed that motion, arguing the supersedeas bond 
should be $310,287.13. On January 20, 1989 White Pine posted a 
supersedeas bond in the amount of $79,793.36 pursuant to the trial 
court's order, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B". 
D. Events Giving Rise to This Request. On November 1, 1989, in 
accordance with para. 3 of the March 17, 1989 Order permitting Lot 
1 to be used as security for increases, if any, in the supersedeas 
bond amount, the Sharps filed their Request for Hearing on (1) a 
previously filed Motion to Supplement Judgment; (2) their request 
for additional attorneys' fees; and (3) their request for an 
increase in the supersedeas bond amount. A copy of that Request 
is attached hereto as Exhibit "C". On December 6, 1989, the Sharps 
filed their Second Motion to Supplement Judgment and Motion to 
Increase Liability on Bond, in which the Sharps again requested, 
inter alia, the trial court increase the amount of the supersedeas 
bond. A copy of that Second Motion is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "D". At no time did the Sharps request the trial court to 
order White Pine to post additional, or different, security. At 
the conclusion of the February 12, 1990 hearing on that Motion, 
the trial court granted the Sharps' Motion "as prayed". See, 
4 
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February 12, 1990 Minute Entry, a copy of which is attached hereto 
as Exhibit "E". 
When the Sharps finally presented their proposed Order on the 
Sharps' Second Motion to White Pine's counsel, however, the Order 
said nothing about increasing the amount of the supersedeas bond; 
instead it required White Pine Mto post additional security" in 
the amount of $136,800,99 on or before March 15, 1990- That Order 
on the Sharps' Second Motion was entered on March 16, 1990, the 
same day White Pine filed its objections to the Order. A copy of 
that March 16, 1990 Order is attached hereto as Exhibit "F" 
That Order further vacated the trial court's March 17, 198^ 
Order Staying Proceedings if such additional security was not 
posted by March 15, 1990, In other words, the prior stay was in 
effect vacated before the order vacating it was entered. 
Furthermore, the Sharps never requested that the stay be vacated 
and that issue was neither raised nor ruled on at the February 12, 
1990 hearing.1 
E. White Pine's First Request For A Stay In the Trial Court. On 
March 16, 1990, White Pine filed its Motions for Continuance of 
Order Staying Enforcement of Judgment Pending Appeal and Approval 
of Supersedeas Bond. A copy of that pleading is attached hereto 
1
 The propriety of these actions is currently before the 
Utah Court of Appeals in a second appeal, designated No. 900332-CA. 
5 
as Exhibit "G". As set forth in that Motion, the surety had 
theretofore filed a financial statement with the trial court 
indicating that the net worth of the surety in March, 1989 totaled 
$220,000.00, more than the sum of the initial shortfall calculated 
in the Judgment and the increase ordered by the trial court. That 
$220,000.00 figure represents the value of Lot 1. Accordingly, 
White Pine requested the trial court enter an Order (1) staying 
enforcement of the judgment pending final determination by the 
Court of Appeals; and (2) declaring that the existing security be 
considered adequate, and in full compliance with the Judgment and 
stay. 
On April 30, 1990, six weeks after that Order had been 
entered, the Sharps filed their memorandum in opposition to that 
Motion and, for the first time, objected to the sufficiency of the 
bond. A copy of that objection is attached hereto as Exhibit "H"• 
On May 7, 1990, White Pine filed its reply, a copy of which is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "I", (1) pointing out that the Sharps 
never objected to the sufficiency of the bond until April 30, 1990, 
and (2) requesting an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the 
real property presently posted as security was sufficient security 
pending appeal. 
White Pine further demonstrated in Exhibit "I" that the Sharps 
were merely re-litigating arguments they had already made in their 
6 
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January 1989 objection to the initial bond. As pointed out in 
White Pine's reply, "the form and nature of the security has been 
approved by the Court, and its acceptability is now the law of the 
case. The only issue remaining is whether the security is 
sufficient to guarantee the payment of unsecured fees, costs and 
interest, which the Court has found to be $216,594.34 as of 
August 1, 1990." On May 7, 1990, White Pine also filed its Notice 
to Submit that motion for decision. The trial court denied White 
Pine's Motion in its June 22, 1990 Order, without ever holding a 
hearing. A copy of the Court's Order is attached hereto as Exhibit 
WJM. 
P. White Pine's First Request For a Stay in the Court of Appeals. 
Before then, however, on June 5, 1990, White Pine received the 
trial Court's Minute Entry denying its motion. Accordingly, on 
June 6, 1990, White Pine filed its Motion for Stay Pending Appeal 
and for Approval of Supersedeas Bond and supporting Memorandum with 
the Court of Appeals. A copy of that memorandum — without 
exhibits — is attached hereto as Exhibit "K. " On June 15, 1990, 
White Pine also filed its Petition for Rehearing on the Court of 
Appeals' May 25, 1990 Opinion. The Court of Appeals never reached 
the merits of White Pine's Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, however. 
Instead, in its June 26, 1990 Order Denying Rehearing and 
Remittitur, the Court of Appeals (1) denied White Pine's Petition 
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for Rehearing; (2) granted a temporary stay for 30 days of all 
further proceedings in the district court; (3) immediately remitted 
the matter to the trial court; and (4) denied White Pine's Motion 
for a Supersedeas Bond as moot. A copy of that Order is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "L". 
G
- White Pine's Second Request for a Stay in the Court of 
Appeals. After studying Utah R. App. P. 36(b), and going so far 
as to discuss the meaning of that Rule with the Chairman of the 
Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, White Pine filed its Motion 
for Stay of Remittitur and Judgment Pending Review, and for 
Approval of Supersedeas Bond with both the Court of Appeals and the 
trial court, on July 12, 1990. Copies of the memoranda supporting 
those two motions are attached hereto as Exhibits "M" and "N" 
respectively. In connection with those two motions, counsel for 
White Pine sent a letter explaining the dual filing to the 
presiding judge of the Court of Appeals, with a copy to the trial 
court judge. A copy of that letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 
"0" . 
H. The Court of Appeals' Action on White Pine's Second Request 
for a Stay, On July 18, 1990, the Court of Appeals denied White 
Pine's request on the grounds it lacked jurisdiction to further 
consider the appeal. A copy of that July 18, 1990 Order is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "P". 
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I. The Trial Court's Action on White Pine's Second Request for 
a Stay. On August-2, 1990, the trial judge's clerk advised counsel 
for White Pine that the trial court had denied White Pine's motion 
for a stay and its request for a hearing. See Affidavit of Glen D. 
Watkins, dated August 2, 1990, filed herewith. Contrary to that 
decision, White Pine was entitled to a stay as a matter of right 
and to a hearing due to the dispositive effect of the trial court's 
denial of White Pine's Motion. 
II. NECESSITY FOR STAY 
When the temporary stay granted by the Court of Appeals lapsed 
on July 26, 1990, the Sharps became free to foreclose the 
Property. Accordingly, on July 26, 1990, counsel for the Sharps 
wrote the Summit County Sheriff requesting him to sell the Property 
as soon as possible. A copy of that letter is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "QM. In a telephone conversation, the Summit County 
Sheriff's Office advised White Pine's counsel that the sale is 
scheduled for August 27, 1990. See, para. 4, Affidavit of Glen D. 
Watkins. 
If the requested stay is not granted, the property will be 
subject to sale, and perhaps sold, before this Court has had an 
opportunity to consider White Pine's Petition for Certiorari and 
the Sharps' response. In a case such as this, there is a 
"particular danger of dismissal for mootness, and thus a special 
9 
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x*eed for seeking a stay [in the appellate court] when the district 
court refuses to enjoin an impending sale of property." See 9 J. 
Moore, B. Ward Moore's Federal Practice (2d ed.) para. 208.03 at 
pp. 8-11. 
III. REASONS WHY A STAY SHOULD BE GRANTED IN THIS CASE. 
A. White Pine is Entitled to a Stay as of Right. Under Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure 8(a) and 36(b), an appellant may apply 
to the Supreme Court for a stay of the judgment after such relief 
has been denied by an inferior court. See Jensen v. Schwendiman, 
744 P.2d 1026, 1027 (Utah App. 1987) (interpreting former Utah R. 
Ct. App. 8). In ruling upon a Rule 8 motion, the appellate court 
applies the same standard trial courts apply in motions brought 
under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 62. Xd. "Thus, a money 
judgment will be stayed as a matter of right upon posting a 
supersedeas bond." Id. (emphasis added), citing American 
Manufacturers' Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting - Paramount 
Theatres, Inc., 385 U.S. 931 (1966) (interpreting substantially 
similar federal rules). Nevertheless, on four separate occasions, 
the trial court and the Court of Appeals have denied White Pine's 
Motions for Stay despite White Pine's willingness to post a 
supersedeas bond. 
If this Court does not grant a stay pending its action on 
White Pine's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, White Pine will be 
10 
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irreparably harmed and White Pine's Petition for Certiorari will 
be rendered moot. ; The judgment in this case is for slightly less 
than One Million Dollars. If a stay is not granted, a million 
dollar issue will have been decided, as pointed out in White Pine's 
Petition for Certiorari, without any appellate court review of the 
merits of that judgment. 
On the other hand, the stay sought by White Pine will have 
little effect, if any, on the Sharps. Their brief in reply to 
White Pine's Petition is due on August 27, 1990, the very date of 
the sale. Once their brief has been filed, Rule 50(e), Utah R. 
App. P., provides that this Court will immediately begin 
consideration of the Petition. White Pine now requests a stay only 
until that determination is made. If this Court denies certiorari, 
White Pine's appellate rights are extinguished, and no further 
basis exists for a stay. On the other hand, if White Pine's 
Petition is granted, it then would be appropriate for White Pine 
to petition this Court for approval of a supersedeas bond to 
protect the Sharps during the pendency of the briefing, argument 
and decision-making process. White Pine stands ready, and at all 
material times has stood ready, to post such a bond, but no court 
has addressed the amount and form of such a bond. 
Although White Pine does not know the amount of time typically 
taken by this Court to act upon a Petition for Certiorari, it 
11 
believes such a decision may be made by October 1, 1990. This 
slight delay in the scheduled sale causes no prejudice to the 
Sharps compared to the devastating effect of the Sharps' execution 
on a million dollar judgment against White Pine and the resulting 
mooting of White Pine's appeal without any appellate review. 
This result is especially tragic in light of refusals by the 
trial court and the Court of Appeals on four different occasions 
to grant White Pine a hearing on a bond White Pine has been trying 
to post for five months. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
White Pine has attempted for the past five months to post a 
supersedeas bond in this case if a court would only hold a hearing 
in this matter and determine the amount. Because of these refusals 
by the lower courts to hold such a hearing, it has become 
essentially impossible for White Pine to post a supersedeas bond 
before the scheduled August 27, 1990 Sheriff's Sale of the property 
at issue in this case. White Pine is therefore forced to make its 
present motion that this Court issue a stay of execution in this 
case until such time as it acts on White Pine's Petition for 




DATED: August 2, 1990. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ANDERSON & WATKINS 
&UUL 
Robert M. Ande^ 
Glen D. Watkir 
Bruce Wycoff 
Attorneys for Appellants Leon H. Saunders; 
Robert Felton; Saunders Land Investment; 
White Pine Ranches and White Pine 
Enterprises 
<UJUL £• fadiMm /fir 
John B. Anderson / 
Attorney for Kenneth R* Norton, 




STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
AUGUST 14, 1990 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
Donald J. Winder, Esq. 
Kathy A. F. Davis, Esq* 
WINDER & HASLAM 
175 West 200 South, #4000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 85110. 
Leon H. Saunders; Robert Felton; 
Saunders Land Investment Corp., 
a Utah corporation; White Pines Ranches, 
a Utah General partnership; White Pine 
Enterprises, a Utah general 
partnership; and Kenneth R. Norton, 
dba Interstate Rentals, Inc., a 
Nevada corporation, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, No. 900360 
v. 
John C. Sharp and Geraldine Y. 
Sharp, 
Defendants and Appellees 
Motion for Stay Pending action on Petition for Certiorari is 
granted. The case is remanded to the district court for the limited 
porpose of fixing the amount of the bond to be posted. 
Geoffrey J. Butler 
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ANDERSON & WATXINS 
Robert M. Anderson, Esq. (#0108) 
Glen D. Watkins, Esq. (#3397) 
Bruce Wycoff, Esq. *(#4448) 
700 Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2018 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEON H. SAUNDERS; ROBERT 
FELTON; J. RICHARD REES ; 
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT CORP. , 
a Utah corporation; WHITE PINE 
RANCHES, a Utah general 
partnership; and WHITE PINE 




JOHN C. SHARP; GERALDINE Y. 
SHARP; and ASSOCIATED TITLE 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
as Trustees, 
Defendants/Appellees. 






Civil No. C87-1621 
Court of Aopeals 
No. 90033*2-CA 
vs. 
ROBERT FELTON; LEON H. 
SAUNDERS; J. RICHARD REES; 
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT 
CORPORATION, a Uta'h corporation; 
KENNETH R. NORTON dba 
Interstate Rentals, Inc.; and 
PAUL H. LANDES, individually; 
WHITE PINE RANCHES, a Utah 
general partnership; and WHITE 
PINE RANCHES, a Utah general 
partnership; and WHITE PINE 
ENTERPRISES, a Utah general 
partnership, 
Counterclaim-Defendants. 
The Plaintiffs and Defendants, through counsel, hereby 
stipulate as follows: 
1. On August 14, 1990, the Supreme Court of Utah issued that 
certain order attached hereto as Exhibit "A" (the "Order••). The 
Order provides that 
Motion for Stay Pending action on Petition for 
Certiorari is granted. The Case is remanded 
to the district court for the limited purpose 
of fixing the amount of the bond to be posted. 
2. The occurrence of the following actions by plaintiffs on 
or before August 24, 1990, shall constitute full and complete 
compliance with the bond requirement set forth in the Order: 
a. Subject to the provisions of this Stipulation, the 
sum of $136,800.99 shall be deposited in the name of Shwildie 
Bewedo, Inc. (hereinafter "Surety) in the following amounts 
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in interest bearing accounts in the following financial 
institutions (collectively, the "Banks"): 
West One Bank — $68,000.00 
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. — $68,800-99 
(The funds deposited in accordance with this paragraph, 
together with such interest as may accrue thereon during the 
period that such funds are so deposited, are hereinafter 
referred to as the "Funds.") 
b. Certificates of deposit issued by the Banks (the 
-Certificates") shall be signed in blank by the Surety and 
deposited by the Surety with the escrow agent mutually 
selected by the parties and identified in Exhibit "B" attached 
hereto (the "Escrow Agent"), who shall thereafter hold the 
Certificates for delivery subject to and in accordance with 
the terms and conditions of this Stipulation. Copies of the 
Certificates shall be delivered to Winder & Haslam, counsel 
for the defendants. 
c. The Surety shall execute this Stipulation as 
provided below for the purposes of acknowledging its agreement 
(i) that the Funds and the Certificates shall be held in 
accordance with the Stipulation for the sole and express 
purpose of securing the Supplemental Supersedeas Bond attached 
3 
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hereto as Exhibit "C" (the "'Supplemental Bond"); and (ii) to 
each and every other term and condition of this Stipulation. 
d. The Surety shall execute and deliver to Winder & 
Haslam a UCC-1 Financing Statement in the form attached hereto 
as Exhibit "D" (the "Financing Statement"), subject to the 
terms and conditions of paragraph 4 below. 
e. The Supplemental Bond is fully executed and filed 
with the Clerk of the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
Immediately on the occurrence of these events, plaintiffs shall be 
entitled to deliver the letter attached hereto as Exhibit "E" for 
the purpose of instructing the Summit County Sheriff in writing 
that the Sheriff's Sale, presently scheduled for August 27, 1990, 
pursuant to that certain Notice of Sheriff's Sale dated August 1, 
199'0, and attached hereto as Exhibit "F," has b€*en stayed by the 
Order and such sale shall be cancelled. 
3. By executing this Stipulation below, Escrow Agent agrees 
to hold the Certificates in trust for defendants «a**i Cursfey subject 
to the terms and conditions of this Stipulation and agrees to 
deliver the Certificates 
a. to defendants, upon the entry of an order of the 
Third Judicial District Court determining that Surety is 
obligated to pay costs and damages to defendants pursuant to 
4 
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the terms and conditions of the Supplemental Bond, fixing the 
amount of such costs and damages and directing Escrow Agent 
to deliver such Certificates to defendants; 
b. to Surety or to such person or entity as the Surety 
may direct in writing, if the Supplemental Bond shall become 
void according to its terms; 
c. to the Clerk of the Third Judicial District Court, 
in the event that Escrow Agent, acting in good faith, 
determines that it has received conflicting written 
instructions from plaintiffs, defendants or the Surety 
respecting Escrow Agent's holding and/or delivery of the 
Certificates, whereupon any such dispute concerning the 
Certificates shall be resolved by an interpleader action in 
the Third Judicial District Court. 
4. The Surety acknowledges and hereby grants defendants a 
security interest in the Certificates and agrees to deliver the 
Financing Statement for the sole and express purpose of securing 
Surety's performance under the Supplemental Bond. This security 
interest is given for no other reason or purpose whatsoever. The 
parties expressly agree that neither the Funds nor the Certificates 
shall secure the performance of the Surety's obligations under that 
certain Supersedeas Bond in the amount of $79,793.36 previously 
5 
filed with the Clerk of the Court in this action (the ••Original 
Bond"), which remains in effect. 
5. The Funds and the Certificates shall not be assigned, 
transferred, cashed, or conveyed except as permitted by this 
Stipulation, and shall not be encumbered unless such encumbrance 
is expressly subordinated to the Surety's obligations under the 
Supplemental Bond and is given by Surety no later than five (5) 
days after the date of this Stipulation. Defendants hereby 
acknowledge their approval of the form and amount of the 
Supplemental Bond. 
6. If the Petition (as that term is defined in the 
Supplemental Bond) is granted, then the stay of execution of the 
Judgment (as that term is defined in the Supplemental Bond) shall 
continue in effect until the District Court has (i) determined the 
amount of any additional supersedeas bond (if any) required to 
continue the stay in effect during the pendency of the appeal 
before the Supreme Court of Utah; (ii) entered an order continuing 
such stay and establishing the amount of any such additional bond; 
and (iii) the period of time established in such order for the 
filing of such additional bond shall have expired without the 
filing of such additional bond. The parties stipulate that, if 
requested of defendants by plaintiffs, the parties shall jointly 
request the Third Judicial District Court to conduct an evidentiary 
6 
0079 
hearing concerning the necessity of any such additional bond and 
the amount thereof,. 
7. Defendants have advised plaintiffs that if the Utah 
Supreme Court does not grant or deny the Petition prior to 
October 1, 1990, defendants may thereafter file a motion seeking 
an order requiring plaintiffs to post an additional supersedeas 
bond as a condition for the stay of execution remaining in effect 
during the pendency of the Petition before the Utah Supreme Court. 
Plaintiffs have advised defendants that under the terms of the 
Order, the defendants are not entitled to seek or require the 
posting of such additional bond during the pendency of the Petition 
and that the posting of any such additional bond is not required 
for the continuance of the stay of execution during such period. 
The parties are presently unable to resolve this dispute. 
Accordingly, plaintiffs and defendants hereby stipulate that 
(i) defendants shall not file any such motion seeking any 
additional supersedeas bond or other security prior to October 1, 
1990; and (ii) this Stipulation shall not prejudice the position 
above of any party respecting the posting of additional security 
during the pendency of the Petition after October 1, 1990; and 
(iii) notwithstanding any motion defendants shall file to require 
an additional bond as a condition for the continuance after 
October 1, 1990, of the stay of execution, the stay of execution 
7 
shall continue in effect until the District Court has determined 
the amount of any such additional supersedeas bond (if any) 
required to continue the stay in effect; (ii) entered an order 
continuing such stay and establishing the amount of any such 
additional bond; and (iii) the period of time established in such 
order for the filing of such additional bond shall have expired 
without the filing of such additional bond. The parties stipulate 
that, if requested of defendants by plaintiffs, the parties shall 
jointly request the Third Judicial District Court to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing concerning the necessity of any such additional 
bond and the amount thereof. 
8. Any obligations of the Plaintiffs and/or the Surety 
pursuant to this Stipulation shall automatically cease upon the 
Supplemental Bond becoming void according to its terms. 
DATED: August 1990. 
ANDERSON & WATXINS 
j^ t&berr M. Anderson 
Glen D. Watkins 
Bruce Wycoff 
Attorneys for Plaintiif3/Appellant3 
8 
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ANDERSON & HOLLAND 
By jry~/i*, /& /W/L/S^ Art /r,-l*J 
y John B. Anderson / / 
Attorneys iox Coxmtexclaim-Def en&ant 
Kenneth R. Norton 
WINDER & HASLAM 
Donald J. Winder 
Kathy A. F. Davis 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
The terms and conditions of the foregoing Stipulation are 
hereby accepted and agreed to by Shwildie Bewedo, Inc., this 23rd 
day of August, 1990: 
SHWILDIE BEWEDOf INC. 
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ACKN0WIJ2DGEMENT 
The terms and conditions of the foregoing Stipulation are 
hereby accepted and agreed to by the undersigned, as the Escrow 
Agent named therein: 
-"• \L/: tit* >•<< r 
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CSRTTFIC&TB OF SERVICE 
On this <^~ -^ day of August, 1990, I hereby certify that I 
caused to be mailed, via first-class United States mail, postage 
prepaid, a true and accurate copy of the foregoing STIPULATION RE: 
SUPPLEMENTAL SUPERSEDEAS BOND, to the following: 
John B. Anderson, Esq. 
ANDERSON & HOLLAND 
623 East 100 South 
P. 0- Box 11643 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Attorneys for Counterclaim-Defendant 
Kenneth R. Norton dba Interstate Rentalsf Inc. 
Stanford B. Owen, Esq* 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
215 South State Street, Suite 1200 
P. 0. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Attorneys for Tracy-Collins and the 
Commissioner of Financial Institutions 
Robert Felton, Esq, 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1305 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
and I caused to be hand delivered, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document to: 
Donald J. Winder, Esq. 
WINDER & HASLAM 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 




Donald J . Winder (#3519) 
Kathy A. F. Davis (#4022) 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000 
Post Office Box 2663 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
Telephone: (;801) 322-2222 
Attorneys for Defendants Sharp 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LEON H. SAUNDERS, et al. , 
Plaintiffs, 
-v-
JOHN C. SHARP, et al., 
Defendants. 
JOHN C. SHARP, et al., 
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs, 
-v-
ROBERT FELTON, et al., 
Counterclaim-Defendants. 
MOTION TO AMEND AMENDED 
ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' 
SECOND MOTION TO 
SUPPLEMENT JUDGMENT AND 
MOTION TO INCREASE 
LIABILITY ON BOND 
Civil No. CS7-1621 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Come now, John C. Sharp and Geraldine Y. Sharp (the 
"Sharps'1), by and through their undersigned counsel, and hereby 
move the Court for an order amending paragraph 2 of the Amended 
Order Re: Defendants' Second Motion to Supplement Judgment and 
Motion to Increase Liability on Bond dated May 14, 1990 (the 
"Amended Order") to delete the phrase " . . . for a total judgment 
of $938,053.02 as of February 12, 1990." 
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As grounds for this Motion the Sharps state as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs, in their appeal of the Amended Order pending 
in the Court of Appeals, Case No* 900332-CA, have argued that the 
phrase at issue results in compounding of interest, despite the 
specific itemization of each calculation of interest. 
2. The Sharps deny that the language has that effect and 
agree that interest should not be compounded on the Judgment* The 
issues on appeal can be simplified by the deletion of the language 
at issue* 
3. This Court has jurisdiction to amend the Order to 
conform to the decision and rulings of the Court actually made and 
to aid in the presentation of the proceedings on appeal. Wasatch 
Mining Co. v. Jehnincs, 14 Utah 221, 46 P. 1106 (1896); Peterson 
v. Ohio Copper Co., 71 Utah 444, 266 P. 1050 (1928). 
DATED this 7 day of November, 1990. 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
Kathy, A.pF.^Davi$J 
Attorneys for Defendants Sharp 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
L hereby certify that, on the y day of November, 1990, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO AMEND 
AMENDED ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT JUDGMENT 
AND MOTION TO INCREASE LIABILITY ON BOND to be hand-delivered to 
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the o f f i c e of: 
Glen D. WatJcins, Esq. 
Robert M. Anderson, Esq. 
ANDERSON & WATKINS 
Valley- Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 -West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1018 
and a copy of the same to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, 
to the following: 
John B. Anderson, Esq. 
ANDERSON & HOLLAND 
623 East 100 South 
Post Office Box 11643 
Salt LaJce City, Utah 84147 
David L. Gladwell 
Chapter 7 Trustee 
Post Office Box 12069 





Kathy A. F. Davis (#4022) 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
Suite 4004 
175 West 200 South 
Post Office Box 2668 
Salt Lake Ci'ty, Utah 84110-2668 
Telephone: (801) 322-2222 
Attorneys for John C. Sharp 
and Geraldine Y. Sharp 
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, NORTHERN DIVISION 
In re : Case No. 88B-03720 
: Chapter 7 
J. RICHARD REES t-
: ORDER 
Debtor. : 
The Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay filed by 
the Sharps came on for hearing before the Honorable Judith A. 
Boulden on the 14th day of November, 1988, at the hour of 
11:00 a.m. The Sharps were represented by their attorneys, 
Donald J. Winder and Kathy A. F. Davis, and the Trustee David 
L. Gladwell appeared. Counsel for the debtor did not make an 
appearance. 
Based upon the Stipulation of the parties and good cause 
appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the automatic stay imposed is 
hereby modified to allow the Sharps to proceed with their 
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state remedies of foreclosure, including publication of their 
notice of sale. 
DATED this day of November, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
BL 
JUDITH A. BOULDEN, Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
PHILIP C. PATTERSON 
Attorney for Debtor 
& DAVID L. GLADWELL 
Chapter 7 Trustee 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
THIS ORDER/J"" 
ENTERED 
NOV 161988 ; 
L A 
C- . LERK 
U.S. BAf-:i '.-.wPTCY COURT 
B y : ^ _ 
Kathy A., P. Davis 
Attorneys for John C. Sharp 
and Geraldine Y. Sharp 
-2-
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Robert Felton, 1056 
310 South Main Street 
Suite 1309 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Phone: 801-359-9216 
3fu ifyt WLnitz^j §>tztzs l&zukvuytty £owt 
district of 3tttafc, €zntvxl MUsicn 
IN RE: 
J. RICHARD REES 
Debtor 
Case No. 88B-03720 
Chapter 7 
************************** 
MOTION TO VACATE ORDER GRANTING RELEASE 
FROM THE AUTOMATIC STAY 
Robert Felton, an interested party, as a Creditor of the above Debtor 
action moves this Court to vacate its Order Granting Relief from the Automatic 
Stay to John Sharp and Geraldine Sharp, and as grounds for this Motion states: 
1. Moveant filed a timely Proof of Claim for both himself and White Pine 
* Ranches, a partnership. 
2. That a Request for Notice of all proceedings was duly filed in 
September 1988, a copy of which is attahced hereto. Notice was not given to 
this Party. 
3. Moveants failed to give this Creditor notice which has deprived him 
of the right to object or be heard at the hearing and is in direct contradiction 
of Rule 27(d)(e) of the Rules of this Court. 
The Relief from the Automatic Stay was improperly granted and this 
Creditor believes that the factors set forth In Re Curtis (Bnkr. Utah) 40 BR 795 
dictates that relief should not be granted and the estate of the Debtor, J. 
ooso 
Richard Rees, will be substantially depleted or impaired by said Order being 
granted. 
NOW, WHEREFORE Robert Felton moves this Court that the Order granting 
Relief from the Automatic Stay in the above entitled action in favor of 
Geraldine Sharp and John Sharp be vacated. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
MOTION TO VACATE ORDER GRANTING RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY by United 
States first-class mail, postage prepaid to Philip Patterson, 427 27th Street, 
Ogden, Utah 84401; Daivd L. Gladwell, Trustee, 4185 Harrison Blvd., Ogden, Utah 
84403; Donald Dean Allen, 2870 Zanker Road, Suite 200, San Jose, California 
95134; James Milton, PO Box 3900, Dept. N., Wayne, Pennsylvania, 19087; Mark 
Gayiord, Attorney 15 West Broadway, Salt Lake City,Utah 84101; Donald Winder, 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 on this the IL^ 
day of November. 
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